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Abstract
Are highly intelligent people less risk averse? Over the last two decades scholars have argued the existence of a negative
relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. Although numerous studies support this, the link between cognitive
ability and risk aversion has not been found consistently. To shed new light on this topic, a systematic review and meta-analysis
was conducted. A total of 97 studies were identified and included for meta-analysis in the domain of gains (N=90,723), 41
in the mixed domain (N=50,936), and 12 in the domain of losses (N=4,544). Results indicate that there exists a weak, but
significant negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the domain of gains. However, no relationship
was observed in the mixed domain or in the domain of losses. Several meta-regressions were performed to investigate the
influence of moderator variables. None of the moderator variables were found to consistently influence the relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion across the domain of gains, mixed and losses. Moreover, no significant difference
was observed between males and females across all three domains. In conclusion, this systematic review and meta-analysis
provides new evidence that the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion is domain specific and not as strong as
suggested by some previous studies.
Keywords: risk aversion, cognitive ability, risk preferences, intelligence, meta-analysis
1 Introduction
In economic theory, risk aversion is assumed to be a key
determinant of human decision making. Naturally, the study
of risk aversion has gained a lot of attention, attracting re-
searchers from all over the world. For the past two decades,
a number of scholars have argued that highly intelligent in-
dividuals tend to be less risk averse (Benjamin, Brown &
Shapiro, 2013; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman & Sunde, 2010,
2018; Frederick, 2005), and thus more likely to optimize
their choices in line with the normative benchmark of Ex-
pected Utility Theory (Rabin, 2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2001).
Although a substantial amount of empirical evidence sup-
ports this conclusion (Dohmen et al., 2018), several studies
do not find cognitive ability to be consistently related to risk
aversion. For instance, some studies have found cognitive
ability to be negatively related to risk aversion in the do-
main of gains but positively related in the mixed domain
(Burks, Carpenter, Goette & Rustichini, 2009; Chapman,
Snowberg, Wang, & Camerer, 2018). Similarly, Andersson,
Holm, Tyran and Wengström (2016), concluded that the re-
lationship might be spurious and dependent on the choice ar-
chitecture of the decision task used to elicit risk preferences.
Specifically, they reported a negative relationship when the
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percentage of alternative responses indicating risk aversion
was set to 80% and a positive relationship when this was set
to 50%. A potential explanation for this result is that people
with low cognitive ability tend to make more random errors,
leading risk aversion to be overestimated for this group when
the percentage of alternatives permitting a choice indicating
risk aversion is high, while underestimated when the oppo-
site is the case (Andersson et al., 2016). Finally, several
studies suggest that the negative relationship between cog-
nitive ability and risk aversion exists only when the decision
task used to elicit risk aversion is unincentivized and purely
hypothetical (Sousa & Rangel, 2014; Taylor, 2013, 2016).
In summary, it is unclear whether a negative relationship
actually exists, and if so, to what extent. The purpose of this
study is to investigate the nature of the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion, through a systematic lit-
erature review and meta-analysis.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First,
a brief definition of cognitive ability and risk aversion is pro-
vided. Next, several theoretical explanations for why cogni-
tive ability and risk aversion might be negatively related are
presented, followed by an outline of the present investigation.
Then the literature review and meta-analysis are discussed.
1.1 Defining Cognitive Ability and Risk Aver-
sion
When conducting a systematic literature review and meta-
analysis it is important to define the key variables of interest
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(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, 2009; Cooper,
2010).
Cognitive ability is one of the best researched, yet
most controversial constructs within the field of psychology
(Eysenck, 1998; Freund & Kasten, 2012; Sternberg, 1985).
In general terms, cognitive ability is considered an exten-
sive category, encompassing a wide range of abilities such
as reasoning, problem solving and abstract thinking (Got-
tfredson, 1997). Throughout the history of the field, several
influential scholars have attempted to converge on a single
definition of the construct (Carroll, 1997; Freund & Kasten,
2012). Although no uniform definition of cognitive ability
exists, Murphy and Davidshofer (1998) provides a definition
that has proven useful in applied psychology (e.g., Seijts &
Crim, 2009; Yeo &Neal, 2004). In line with their definition,
cognitive ability will for the purposes of this study be de-
fined as individual differences in the capacity to successfully
perform tasks that require the manipulation, retrieval, evalu-
ation or processing of mental information. This definition is
closely related to what psychologists refer to as g or general
cognitive ability, a factor considered to be the core of, and
primary source of variance common to, cognitive abilities
and cognitive ability tests (Spearman, 1904a; Yeo & Neal,
2004).
Based on the definition put forward by Fox, Erner and
Walters (2016), an individual will for the purposes of this
study be considered risk averse if he or she prefers a certain or
risky option to a riskier option with equal or higher expected
value. Conversely, an individual will be considered risk
seeking, if he/she prefers a risky option to a certain or less
risky option with higher expected value.
1.2 Theoretical Explanations
Various theoretical explanations have been put forward to
explain why cognitive ability and risk aversion might be
negatively related. One prominent explanation based on
dual process theory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman
& Frederick, 2002; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004) is
that people with high cognitive ability are more reflective
and, thus, less likely to make judgement and decision errors
(Benjamin et al., 2013). According to dual-process theory,
judgment and decision-making is the result of an interaction
between two distinct cognitive processes; type 1 and type 2
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 are fast, automatic, low-
effort and high-capacity processes, usually associated with
heuristic and intuitive decision-making (Evans & Stanovich,
2013; Frankish, 2010). Type 2 are conversely, slow, con-
trolled, high-effort and low capacity processes, typically
associated with deliberate, reflective and rational decision-
making (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Frankish, 2010). Given
that type 2 processes are assumed to tax working memory
capacity (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich, 2010), which
is known to be highly correlated with cognitive ability (Con-
way, Kane & Engle, 2003; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Süß,
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002), it is likely
that people with high cognitive ability are more capable of
engaging in reflective and rational decision-making. The
dual-process explanation holds that people with high cogni-
tive ability are likely to realize that risk aversion over small
stakes is irrational (Rabin, 2000; Rabin & Thaler, 2001),
because they have more cognitive capacity to deliberately
reflect and think about their choices. In support of this
argument, Cokely and Kelley (2009) found that highly in-
telligent individuals were more likely to engage in expected
value maximization, report more elaborate and reflective
thought patterns, and spend more time deliberating when
choosing between prospects. Moreover, many other stud-
ies have shown that people with high cognitive ability dis-
play fewer behavioral biases across a wide range of decision
tasks that arguably require type 2 processes to derive what
is considered to be the normative response (e.g., Bergman,
Ellingsen, Johannesson & Svensson, 2010; Hoppe & Kus-
terer, 2011; Oechssler, Roider & Schmitz, 2009; Stanovich
& West, 1998; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011).
A similar explanation is that people with high cognitive
ability are more likely to bracket their choices broadly; con-
sidering the bearing of their experimental decisions in a
broader lifetime perspective (Dohmen et al., 2010; Koch &
Nafziger, 2016; Read, Loewenstein & Rabin, 1999). Theo-
retically, this makes sense, as broad bracketing is cognitively
taxing compared to narrow bracketing (Read et al., 1999), in-
creasing the likelihood that people with low cognitive ability
engages less in broad bracketing due to a lack of cogni-
tive resources. Hence, given that broad bracketing has been
linked with lower levels of risk aversion (Gneezy & Potters,
1997; Hilgers & Wibral, 2014; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman
& Schwartz, 1997), it is not unlikely that broad bracketing
is one of the driving forces behind the negative relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion observed in some
previous studies.
A third possible explanation is that risk preferences play
a role in the development of cognitive ability, and that in-
dividual risk preferences influence people’s choice of envi-
ronment, which in turn could affect cognitive development
(Dohmen et al., 2018). As an example, risk preferences
might play a role in choices about investment in education,
which has been shown to foster the development of cognitive
abilities (Falch & Sandgren Massih, 2011; Ritchie, Bates &
Deary, 2015; Schneeweis, Skirbekk&Winter-Ebmer, 2014).
On the other hand, it is of course possible that people with
high cognitive ability seek out environments which foster the
development of risk tolerance. For instance, several studies
have shown that people with high cognitive ability are more
active in the stock market (Christelis, Jappelli & Padula,
2010; Grinblatt, Keloharju & Linnainmaa, 2011; Van Rooij,
Lusardi & Alessie, 2011), which could lead them to become
more risk tolerant over time.
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Finally, it could be that the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and risk aversion, is coevolutionary: meaning
that certain configurations of cognitive ability and risk aver-
sion have been evolutionary beneficial (Dohmen et al., 2010,
2018). Hence, evolutionary pressures might have created a
general tendency for low cognitive ability to be coupled with
risk aversion and vice versa.
1.3 The Present Investigation
In light of the mixed findings on the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion, the first aim of this study
is to systematically investigate the nature of the relationship
across the domain of gains, mixed and losses. In line with the
existing literature, the second aim is to examine to what ex-
tent the choice architecture of the decision task used to elicit
risk preferences influence the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and risk aversion. The current study will also ask
whether the relationship exists only when the decision task
is unincentivized and purely hypothetical, and whether the
relationship is influenced by how cognitive ability is mea-
sured. Finally, given that age (Defoe, Dubas, Figner & van
Aken, 2015; Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin&Hertwig, 2011)
and gender (Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Croson & Gneezy,
2009) have been found to be related to risk preferences, the
last aim of this study is to investigate the influence of these
variables on the relationship between cognitive ability and
risk aversion.
2 Method
In line with the guidelines provided by Cooper (2010) the
systematic literature review and meta-analysis performed in
this study comprised three steps: (1) literature search, (2)
data extraction and coding, and (3) data analysis.
2.1 Step 1. Literature Search
In order to identify studies examining the relationship be-
tween cognitive ability and risk aversion, the following four
electronic databases were searched: Econlit, PsycInfo, Busi-
ness Source Complete, and Academic Search Complete. All
databases were searched using the following keywords in
the first search field: “risk avers*” OR “loss avers*” OR
“prospect theory” OR “expected utility” OR “risk toleran*”
OR“risk preference*”OR“risk neutral”OR“risk attitude*”;
and the following keywords in the second search ﬁeld:
“cognitive abilit*” OR “intelligence” OR “IQ” OR “cog-
nitive skills” OR “mental abilit*” OR “cognitive function*”
OR “cognitive performance” OR “intelligence quotient” OR
“general mental abilit*” OR “cognitive capacit*” OR “men-
tal capacit*” OR “intellectual function*”. The keywords
from the two search ﬁelds were combined using the Boolean
operator “AND”, leading to the ﬁnal search string presented
below: (“risk avers*” OR “loss avers*” OR “prospect the-
ory” OR “expected utility” OR “risk toleran*” OR “risk
preference*” OR “risk neutral” OR “risk attitude*”) AND
(“cognitive abilit*” OR “intelligence” OR “IQ” OR “cogni-
tive skills” OR “mental abilit*” OR “cognitive function*”
OR “cognitive performance” OR “intelligence quotient” OR
“general mental abilit*” OR “cognitive capacit*” OR “men-
tal capacit*” OR “intellectual function*”)
The search was limited to studies written in English pub-
lished from 1900 to 2018 and yielded a total of 692 hits.
Next, Scopus was searched using the same combination of
keywords in ﬁrst and second search-ﬁeld. The Scopus search
was also limited to studies written in English, published from
1900 to 2018 and yielded a total of 658 hits. Finally, four in-
dependent searches onGoogle Scholar were conducted using
the keywords: (1) “risk aversion” AND “cognitive ability”;
(2) “risk aversion” AND “intelligence”; (3) “risk aversion”
AND “mental ability”; (4) “risk aversion” AND “cognitive
skills”. Each independent Google Scholar search resulted in
somewhere between 625 and 19,900 hits, of which Google
Scholar displayed the ﬁrst thousand. All searches were con-
ducted from 03.12.2018 to 11.12.2018. To supplement the
electronic search, a manual search of reference lists of key
empirical and theoretical articles was performed. The man-
ual search yielded no additional studies. For all studies
identiﬁed as relevant, title and abstract were screened for ap-
propriate content and a total of 633 studies were extracted for
full text screening. For an overview of the literature search
process see Figure 1.
2.2 Exclusion and Inclusion Criteria
Studies were included for data extraction and coding if
they reported either Pearson´s r, Spearman´s rho, means
and standard deviations (i.e., descriptive statistics), or beta-
coeﬃcients for the relationship between cognitive ability
and risk aversion. Studies were excluded if they (a) in-
vestigated decision-making under ambiguity, (b) relied on
self-report measures of risk aversion, (c) used academic per-
formance, literacy, reading proﬁciency, ﬁnancial literacy, or
educational attainment as proxies for cognitive ability, or (d)
solely relied on participants experiencing any form of mental
health problems or cognitive impairment. After carefully re-
viewing all 633 studies based on the inclusion and exclusion
criteria, 287 studies were selected for coding and data extrac-
tion. More speciﬁcally, 111 studies were excluded because
they relied upon self-report measures of risk aversion, while
114 studies were excluded for using either academic per-
formance, literacy, reading proﬁciency, ﬁnancial literacy or
educational attainment as proxies for cognitive ability. An-
other 107 studies were excluded because they did not report
data on either cognitive ability, risk aversion or both. Three
studies were excluded because data were available only for
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participants with mental health problems or cognitive im-
pairment. Finally, 11 studies were excluded for investigating
decision-making under ambiguity.
2.3 Step 2. Data Extraction and Coding
In order to obtain as much data as possible, all corresponding
authors were contacted via email and asked to provide the
raw data or any relevant information on the relationship be-
tween cognitive ability and risk aversion in all three domains.
The response rate was approximately 29%. Next, data was
extracted from the remaining 205 studies from which the
raw data was not obtained. Following, Peterson and Brown
(2005), Pearson’s r was imputed from beta coeﬃcients using
the following formula whenever necessary: r = β + .05λ,
where λ = 1 if β > 0 and λ = 0 if β < 0. In cases where only
means and standard deviations were reported, Pearson´s r
was computed by using the formulas provided by Borenstein
et al. (2009). Whenever data for the same participants was
reported across multiple outcomes, eﬀect sizes were com-
bined, in line with guidelines provided by Borenstein and
colleagues (2009). In 134 studies out of the 287 studies in-
cluded for data extraction, the information reported on the
relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion was
insuﬃcient. That is, even though these studies appeared to
contain data on both cognitive ability and risk aversion nei-
ther Pearson´s r, Spearman’s rho, nor the data necessary to
impute Pearson´s r were reported. Hence, data was available
from 153 articles. Among these, several had overlapping
data. To avoid using the same data multiple times, only one
study per data set was included in the ﬁnal analysis. In total,
97 studies were included for meta-analysis in the domain
of gains, 41 in the mixed domain, and 12 in the domain of
losses.
To allow for moderator analysis, studies were coded based
on several diﬀerent features. First, all studies were coded
based on sample characteristics, including mean age of the
participants, male to female ratio, and sample type (i.e., stu-
dent, community or children). Second, studies were coded
based on the class of decision task used to measure risk aver-
sion. More speciﬁcally, each decision task was categorized
based on whether it was incentivized, the probabilities and
payoﬀs were varied or kept constant and if there was a certain
option or not. The percentage of possible risk averse choices
(i.e., the percentage of choices in which the riskier option
had equal or higher expected value than the safer option) was
also calculated if possible. Third, in order to investigate the
extent to which the study purpose inﬂuenced results, all stud-
ies were coded based on whether or not one of their primary
objectives was to investigate the relationship between cog-
nitive ability and risk aversion. Fourth, studies were coded
based on the psychometric measure used to assess cognitive
ability (as described shortly), and whether or not participants
received payment for participating in the experiment.
2.4 Measures of Cognitive Ability
All studies included measured cognitive ability with one of
the following psychometric measures: Cognitive Reﬂection
Task (CRT), Raven´s Progressive Matrices (RPM), numer-
acy tests (NUM), working memory capacity tests (WMC),
or cognitive ability test batteries (CATB).
CRT is a three-item instrument designed to measure cog-
nitive ability and reﬂective thinking (Frederick, 2005). The
task is frequently used in experimental research within the
ﬁeld of economics (e.g., Albaity, Rahman, &Shahidul, 2014;
Corgnet et al., 2016; Deppe et al., 2015) and has been asso-
ciated with other measures of cognitive ability such as the
Wonderlic Personnel Test (Frederick, 2005).
RPM is a widely recognized nonverbal measure of ﬂuid
intelligence which has been used across a wide range of dis-
ciplines (Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1990; Raven, 2000). It
consists of 3 x 3 matrices, in which the bottom right ﬁgure
is missing and must be identiﬁed among several alterna-
tives. The test-taker is instructed to look across the rows
and/or down the columns to ﬁnd a pattern and determine
the missing entry. Importantly, the diﬃculty of the matrices
is gradually increased, so that it requires greater mental ca-
pacity to determine the missing entry for each consecutive
matrix (Raven, 2000).
NUM refers to a variety of tests designed to measure
numerical ability. NUM usually consists of a range of math-
ematical problems to be solved without using a calculator
(e.g., Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal & Garcia-Retamero,
2012; Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 2001; Weller et al., 2013).
Numerical ability has consistently been linked with numer-
ous cognitive ability measures (e.g., Cokely et al., 2012;
Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Del Missier, Mäntylä & De Bruin,
2012; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein & Pardo, 2012), and can
be considered a reasonable measure of cognitive ability.
WMC typically consist of a set of tasks where the partic-
ipant is asked to recall a number of items while performing
an attention-demanding assignment (Engle, 2002). Working
memory capacity has consistently been found to be highly
correlated with general intelligence (Conway et al., 2003;
Kyllonen & Christal, 1990), and is believed to be involved
in a wide range of complex cognitive operations, such as
comprehension, reasoning and problem solving (Conway et
al., 2005; Engle, 2002).
CATB refers to comprehensive measures of intelligence
where several instruments are used to assess diﬀerent as-
pects of an individual’s cognitive ability. Common examples
of such measures are the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS;Wechsler, 2008), and the Stanford-Binet Intelligence
Scale (SBIS; Roid, 2003), which both consist of no less than
ten subtests (DiStefano & Dombrowski, 2006; Roid, 2003;
Wechsler, 2008). Although CATB´s provide a comprehen-
sive measure of cognitive ability, it is often not feasible
to use such measures in experimental research, as they are
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Records identified through 
Google Scholar
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Source Complete, and Academic Search Complete
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Title and abstract screened
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Full text screened
(N= 633)
Records excluded 
(N= 4717)
Records included for data extraction
(N= 287)
Records excluded based 
on inclusion and 
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(N= 346)
Records included 
(N= 153)
Gains - Records 
included without 
overlapping data 
(N= 97)
Mixed - Records 
included without 
overlapping data 
(N= 41)
Losses - Records 
included without 
overlapping data 
(N = 12) 
Figure 1: Overview of the literature search.
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time consuming and diﬃcult to administer. Instead, most
researchers either adopt a small number of subtests from a
well-established CATB, or construct a less time consuming
CATB by combining a few commonly used cognitive ability
measures such as those mentioned above (e.g., RPM, CRT,
NUM WMC, etc.). Accordingly, CATB will in this study
refer to any measure utilizing more than one instrument to
assess cognitive ability.
2.5 Measures of Risk Aversion
Across all three domains risk aversion was measured with
one of the following decisions tasks: Bomb Risk Elicita-
tion Task (BRET), Decision Task Battery (DTB), Eckel-
Grossman Risk Task (EGRT), Ellsberg Urn Risk Task
(EURT),GiftGamblingTask (GGT), IncomeGamblingTask
(IGT), Lottery Task (LT), Multiple Price List (MPL), One-
shot Gambling Task (OGT), Sabater-Grande-Georgantzis
Lottery Panel (SGG), Wheel of Fortune Task (WFT), Cups
Task (CT), Portfolio Choice Task (PCT), Budget Line Al-
location Task (BLAT), Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT),
Gneezy-Potters Investment Task (GPIT) or Adaptive Lottery
Task (ALT). Speciﬁcally, risk aversion was measured with
13 diﬀerent decision tasks in the domain of gains (i.e. ALT,
BRET, CT, DTB, EGRT, EURT, GGT, IGT, LT, MPL, OGT,
SGG,WTF), 12 in themixed domain (i.e., ALT, BLAT, CGT,
DTB, EGRT, GPIT, IGT, LT, MPL, OGT, PCT, SGG), and
6 in the domain of losses (i.e., ALT, CT, EGRT, GGT, LT,
MPL).
BRET is a dynamic real time elicitation task in which the
participant is required to decide how many boxes to collect
in a matrix containing 100 boxes, one of which hides a bomb
(Crosetto&Filippin, 2013). The payoﬀ of each box collected
is exactly the same. Hence, the potential earning increases
linearly. In case the box with the bomb is collected, the
payoﬀ for the whole round is zero. As all outcomes, as well
as the probabilities associated with each outcome, is fully
speciﬁed, BRET allows for a good estimation of individual
risk preferences in the domain of gains, simply by counting
the number of boxes collected (Crosetto & Filippin, 2013;
Holzmeister & Pfurtscheller, 2016).
EGRT is a simple risk elicitation method in which the par-
ticipant is asked to choose between one of six gambles (Dave,
Eckel, Johnson & Rojas, 2010; Eckel & Grossman, 2008).
Each gamble typically involves a 50% chance of winning a
low payoﬀ and a 50% chance of winning a high payoﬀ. One
of the gambles is a sure thing, in which the low and high
payoﬀ is exactly equal. The gambles are designed so that the
expected payoﬀ increases linearly with risk, as represented
by the standard deviation (Charness, Gneezy & Imas, 2013).
A risk averse individual should thus choose gambles with
lower standard deviations whereas a risk neutral individual
should choose the gamble with the highest expected return.
InEURT, participants are presentedwith an urn containing
ﬁve blue and ﬁve yellow balls. For each round a random ball
is drawn from the urn, and participants are asked to guess its
color. If the participants guess correctly, they win a speciﬁed
amount of money. Before the ball is drawn, however, each
participant is asked to indicate the price they are willing to
sell the bet for. A computer then generates a random oﬀer
to buy the bet. If this sum is higher than the minimum
selling price set by the participant, the bet is sold and no
ball is drawn from the urn. If the oﬀer is lower than the
minimum selling price, a ball is drawn and the bet is carried
out. Risk aversion is inferred based on the minimum selling
price set by the participant. A high selling price indicates
risk tolerance while a low selling price suggests risk aversion
(Borghans, Heckman, Golsteyn & Meijers, 2009).
The GGT is a simple decision task often used to elicit
risk preferences among children (Levin & Hart, 2003). The
participant is presented with four identical boxes, two of
which are placed to the left of the participant and two of
which are placed to the right. Under each box on the left
side, a small gift is hidden, whereas two small gifts are
hidden under one of the boxes on the right. Risk aversion is
measured by asking the participant to indicate from which
side he or she would like to draw a box. As the expected
value of the two sides are equal, participants are considered
risk averse if they prefer to draw a box from the left side.
MPL refers to a class of decision tasks in which partic-
ipants are asked to choose between two diﬀerent lotteries
(Dohmen et al., 2018). MPL generally comes in two for-
mats: The ﬁrst format involves two lotteries in which the
potential outcome of each lottery are kept constant, while
the probabilities of the outcomes vary from row to row (e.g.,
Holt & Laury, 2002); the second format involves a safe and
a risky lottery, in which the probabilities of outcomes are
kept constant, while the potential outcomes of either the safe
or risky lottery are gradually increased (e.g. Andersson et
al., 2016). Risk preferences are inferred either based on
the number of risky choices made, or on the participant’s
unique switching point (i.e., the point where the participant
switched from the risky to the safe lottery).
OGT refers to a simple type of decision tasks in which
the participant is presented with only one choice between a
safe/risky option and a riskier option with equal or higher
expected value. In this task, risk aversion is inferred based
on whether the participant chose the riskiest option or not.
In IGT participants are asked to consider several hypothet-
ical income gambles. More speciﬁcally, the participants are
asked to choose between a certain income for some speciﬁed
amount of time or a gamble in which this income is either
increased or decreased by some amount with probability p
and 1–p (e.g., Barsky, Juster, Kimball & Shapiro, 1997;
Beauchamp et al., 2017). Based on the number of rejected
gambles, individual risk preferences can be determined.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 14, No. 3, May 2019 Cognitive ability and risk aversion 240
LT refers to any decision task in which the participants are
asked to choose between a number of gambles sequentially.
Each set of gambles can be constructed in a number of diﬀer-
ent ways so that the probabilities and payoﬀs associated with
each gamble changes or are kept constant. Moreover, each
gamble may diﬀer with regard to whether the participants
has to choose between two diﬀerent gambles, or a certain
option and a gamble. As with most decision tasks, risk aver-
sion is inferred based on the number of risky and safe option
chosen by the participant.
SGG is a standard risk elicitation task in which partic-
ipants are asked to choose one gamble from four diﬀerent
lottery panels (Sabater-Grande & Georgantzis, 2002). Each
panel consists of ten gambles with decreasing probabilities
and increasing expected value. Consequently, if the partici-
pant chooses the ﬁrst gamble in each lottery panel, he or she
can be considered highly risk averse. If the participant, on
the other hand, chooses the last gamble in each lottery panel
he or she can be considered risk tolerant.
WFT is a visual gambling task in which the participants
are asked tomake a series of choices between pairs of fortune
wheels (Blankenstein, Crone, van den Bos & van Duijvenvo-
orde, 2016). The ﬁrst fortune wheel is always presented as
a certain option that pays some speciﬁed amount of money.
The second fortune wheel, on other hand, is presented as a
risky option in which the magnitude of the monetary out-
come and the probability of obtaining this outcome varies.
Accordingly, risk aversion is inferred based on the number
of times each participant prefers the ﬁrst over the second
fortune wheel.
CT is another visual gambling task in which participants
are asked to choose between 54 gambles presented as two
arrays of cups containing monetary payoﬀs (Levin, Weller,
Pederson & Harshman, 2007). In each trial, participants
are asked to decide from which of two arrays of two, three
or ﬁve cups containing monetary payoﬀs they would like
to draw a cup. One of the two arrays is a certain option
in which all of the cups contain the same payoﬀ whereas
the second array is a risky option in which only one of the
cups contains a monetary payoﬀ. In some of the gambles,
the risky option has the same expected value as the certain
option while in others the expected value is either higher or
lower for the risky option. Risk aversion is estimated based
on the number of times the participant decides to draw a cup
from the certain array.
PCT is a decision task in which the participants are asked
to rank their most and least preferred investment options
from a menu of three investment portfolios: safe, risky and
intermediate (e.g., Bateman, Stevens & Lai, 2015). The
safe option guarantees an annual return of x% while the
risky option provides a mean annual return of x% + y%
with a standard deviation of z%. The intermediate option
is dynamically rebalanced so that 50% is invested in the
safe and the risky option. The mean annual return of the
intermediate option is, thus, the average of the safe and risky
option with a standard deviation of z%/2. A highly risk
averse investor would, in this setup, always prefer the safe
option to the intermediate and risky option, as well as the
intermediate option to the risky option. Consequently, risk
aversion is estimated based on how each participant ranks
the attractiveness of the three portfolios described above.
In BLAT participants are asked to allocate points between
accounts x and y, which are represented visually on a two-
dimensional budget line (Choi, Fisman, Gale & Kariv, 2007;
Choi, Kariv, Müller & Silverman, 2014). After allocating
points, either x or y is randomly chosen, and the participant
receives the points he or she allocated to the chosen account,
while all points in the other account is lost. On each budget
line, there are three points: A, B and C. Point A is where
the budget line hits the y-axis and represents allocating all
points to the y account. Conversely, B is where the budget
line hits the x-axis and represents allocating all points to the
x account. Finally, point C, which lies on the 45-degree line,
ensures a certain payoﬀ and corresponds to an equal alloca-
tion between x and y. Importantly, the slope of the budget
line AB is always chosen so that the payoﬀ of choosing an
allocation between A and C has a higher expected return
than point C, whereas choosing an allocation between B and
C has a lower expected return than C. Hence, an individual
who is inﬁnitely risk averse will always choose an allocation
equal to C, whereas an individual who is less risk averse or
risk seeking will choose an allocation between A and C or
B and C, respectively. This makes it possible to estimate
individual risk preferences based on the amount of points
allocated between A and C, and B and C on the budget line.
GPIT is a classic investment task in which the participant
have to decide how much to invest ($x), out of an initial
endowment ($y), in a risky asset (e.g., Charness, Gneezy &
Imas, 2013; Gneezy & Potters, 1997). The amount invested
yields a dividend of $kx (k > 1) with probability p and is lost
with probability 1–p. The money not invested ($y–x) is kept
by the participant. The payoﬀ of each choice is therefore
$y–x+kx, with probability p, and $y–x with probability 1–p.
In all cases k and p is chosen so that the expected value of
investing is either higher or equal to the expected value of not
investing. Risk aversion is estimated based on the amount
invested, with lower amounts indicating higher levels of risk
aversion.
In CGT a yellow token is hidden under one of ten blue or
red boxes (e.g., Clark et al., 2008). The amount of red and
blue boxes varies from trial to trial, so that the probability
that the token is hidden under a blue or red box, changes. On
each trial, participants have to decide howmuch to wager out
of their current endowment, that the yellow token is hidden
under either a red or a blue box. If the participant chooses
the right color, the amount wagered is added to his or her
current endowment. Conversely, if the participant chooses
the wrong color the amount is lost. Just like in the GPIT, risk
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aversion is inferred based on the amount wagered on each
trial.
ALT is similar to the standard LT, in which participants
are asked to choose between a number of gambles sequen-
tially. However, as opposed to the standard LT, the gam-
bles in ALT is iteratively adapted based on the participant’s
choices, allowing for a more eﬃcient and precise estimation
of individual risk preferences (e.g., Chapman, Snowberg, et
al., 2018; Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp & Hertwig, 2017).
Finally, DTB refers to measures of risk aversion relying
on more than one single elicitation task. That is any measure
in which two or more of the decision tasks described above
were used to construct a composite score of risk aversion
within the domain of gains, mixed or losses.
2.6 Step 3. Data Analysis
First, all eﬀect sizes were converted into a common metric
(i.e., correlation coeﬃcients), as previously described. Cor-
relations were deﬁned as negative when people with higher
cognitive ability were to be less risk averse. In line with
the guidelines provided by Borenstein et al. (2009), all cor-
relation coeﬃcients were converted into Fisher’s z. Next,
a random-eﬀects model meta-analysis using the restricted
maximum likelihood estimator (REML; Viechtbauer, 2005,
2010) was performed in order to investigate the relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion for the domains
of gains, mixed and losses. Moreover, two additional meta-
analyses were conducted in each of these three domains, one
using only males and one using only females. A random-
eﬀects model was chosen, as opposed to a ﬁxed-eﬀect model,
because the assumptions behind the random-eﬀects model
tend to be more realistic (Borenstein et al., 2009; Cooper,
2010). Results from the meta-analyses is presented as a cor-
relation, ρ, equivalent to Pearson’s r. Correlations ranging
from .10 to .29, .30 to .49 and .50 to 1.00 are interpreted as
weak, moderate and strong, respectively (Cohen, 1988).
In order to test for heterogeneity, Q and I2 statistics were
calculated. The Q statistic was computed by summing the
squared deviations of each study’s eﬀect from the combined
eﬀect size, weighting each study by its inverse variance
(Huedo-Medina, Sánchez-Meca, Marín-Martínez &Botella,
2006). The Q statistic tests for heterogeneity by testing the
null hypothesis that all studies share a common eﬀect size
(Borenstein et al., 2009). Under the null hypothesis, the Q
statistic follows a chi-square distribution with k–1 degrees
of freedom, k being the number of studies included in the
meta-analysis (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). A signiﬁcant
Q indicates that true heterogeneity exists (Borenstein et al.,
2009). The I2 statistic investigates the amount of true het-
erogeneity by dividing the result of the Q statistic and its
degrees of freedom (k–1) by the Q value, and multiplying it
by 100 (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). Consequently, the I2
statistic can be interpreted as the percentage of total variance
in a set of observed eﬀect sizes due to true heterogeneity.
Higgins, Thompson, Deeks and Altman (2003) suggest that
I2 approximating 25%, 50%, and 75% can be considered as
low, moderate, and high, respectively.
To investigate the impact of moderator variables, sev-
eral meta-regressions were performed. Meta-regressions are
analogous to standard regression analysis, and can, with ap-
propriate coding, be used to examine the inﬂuence of both
categorical and continuous moderator variables (Hedges &
Pigott, 2004; Viechtbauer, 2010). All moderator analyses
were performed independently, as testing multiple modera-
tors simultaneously may lead to a mis-estimation of moder-
ator eﬀects, especially when the number of studies included
is small (Steel & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2002).
Publication bias, the tendency to leave out non-signiﬁcant
results and publish only positive results, was examined in
two steps. First, it was visually assessed using a funnel plot
of all studies included in the random-eﬀects model meta-
analysis. If no publication bias exists, the two sides of the
funnel plot should be symmetrical (Borenstein et al., 2009;
Rothstein, Sutton & Borenstein, 2006). That is, if no pub-
lication bias exists, the observed eﬀect sizes should not be
asymmetrically distributed around the combined eﬀect size.
Second, a rank correlation test (Begg & Mazumdar, 1994)
and a regression test (Egger, Smith, Schneider & Minder,
1997) was performed to test for funnel plot asymmetry.
Finally, case deletion diagnostics were performed in or-
der to identify any inﬂuential studies and/or possible outliers
(Viechtbauer, 2010; Viechtbauer & Cheung, 2010). Accord-
ing toViechtbauer (2010), studiesmight be considered either
as inﬂuential or as outliers if one or more of the following
statements are true: (a) the absolute DFFITS value is larger
than 3
√
p/(k–p) where p is the number of model coeﬃcients
and k the number of studies; (b) the lower tail area of a
chi-square distribution with p degrees of freedom cutoﬀ by
the Cook’s distance is larger than .50; (c) the hat value is
larger than 3(p/k) or (d) the DFBETAS value is larger than
1. The DFFITS value is an estimate of how many standard
deviations the predicted eﬀect for the ith study changes af-
ter excluding the ith study from the model ﬁtting. Cook´s
distance is essentially the Mahalanobis distance between the
full set of predicted values with or without the ith study
included in the model ﬁtting. The hat value is simply the
ith diagonal element of the hat matrix, also known as the
so-called leverage of the ith study. Finally, the DFBETAS
value indicates how many standard deviations the estimated
correlations coeﬃcient changes after removing the ith study
from the model ﬁtting.
All statistical analyses were performed in R (R Core
Team, 2017) with the following packages installed: metafor
(Viechtbauer, 2010) and dplyr (Wickham, François, Henry
& Müller, 2018).
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3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Results for the Domain of
Gains
As previously described, a total of 97 studies published be-
tween 2003 and 2018 were included for meta-analysis in the
domain of gains (N = 90,723). The mean age of participants
was available for 66 studies and ranged from 6.0 to 81.2
years with a mean of 29.5. Participants were either univer-
sity, college or high school students in 56 of the 97 studies
included. Out of the remaining 41 studies, 35 were based
on various community samples, while 5 relied on samples
of children. For the last study the speciﬁcs of the sample
used was not available. In 35 studies there were more males
than females, while the opposite was true in 42 studies. The
male to female ratio was exactly 1.00 in one study while
the proportion of males and females was unavailable for 19
studies. Risk aversion was measured using MPL in 45 stud-
ies, LT in 26, OGT in 7, DTB in 5, EGRT in 4 and BRET
in 3. In the remaining 7 studies risk aversion was assessed
with one of the following decision tasks: ALT, CT, EURT,
GGT, IGT, SGG, and WFT. The decision task was fully in-
centivized in 23 studies, randomly incentivized in 47, and
purely hypothetical in 14. Moreover, participants were paid
for participation in 81 out of 97 studies. Information about
whether the participants were paid and the extent to which
the decision task was incentivized were unavailable in 16
and 13 studies, respectively. The average payment for the
whole experiment ranged from $5 to $125 with a mean of
$30. The average payment was, however, only available for
34 studies. Cognitive ability was measured using CATB in
36 studies, CRT in 30, RPM in 18, NUM in 12 and WMC
in 1. Finally, in 24 of the 97 studies included, one of the
primary purposes of the study was to investigate the rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. For
an overview of the studies included for meta-analysis in the
domain of gains see Table 1.
3.2 Random-Effects Model Meta-Analysis for
the Domain of Gains
Results from the random-eﬀects model meta-analysis sug-
gest that there exist a weak but signiﬁcant negative rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the
domain of gains (k = 97, ρ = −.07, Z = −6.11, p < .001,
95% CI [−.10, −.05]). Looking at the results for males (k =
51, ρ = −.09, Z = − 4.81, p < .001, 95% CI [−.12, −.05])
and females only (k = 48, ρ = −.05, Z = −4.39, p < .001,
95% CI [−.08, −.03]) a similar pattern emerges. The forest
plots depicted in Figure 2 provides an overview of the stud-
ies included, their individual correlation coeﬃcients with
95% conﬁdence intervals, and the overall results from the
random-eﬀects model meta-analyses.
3.3 Test for Heterogeneity in the Domain of
Gains
The results from the Q statistics were highly signiﬁcant for
the full sample (Q = 612.83, df = 96, p <.001) as well as
for males only (Q = 210.79, df = 50, p < .001), indicating
the presence of true heterogeneity. The Q statistic for fe-
males only, however, was not signiﬁcant (Q = 60.38, df =
47, p >.05), suggesting that only a small amount of true het-
erogeneity exist between the studies included when looking
exclusively at the results for females. These results were
further conﬁrmed by the I2 statistics which indicated that the
amount of total variance observed due to true heterogeneity
was high for the full sample (I2 = 88.69%, 95% CI [83.49,
92.09]) andmales only (I2 =78.48%, 95%CI [60.85, 89.44]),
but low for females (I2 = 33.56%, 95% CI [.00, 72.33]).
3.4 Moderator Analysis for the Domain of
Gains
The results from the meta-regressions showed that none of
the moderator variables had any inﬂuence on the relation-
ship between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the do-
main of gains for the full sample and males only (see Table
2–3). Looking at the results for females only, the meta-
regressions suggest that both the decision task used, and the
payoﬀ structure of the riskier choice explained a substantial
amount of the observed heterogeneity (Table 4). Speciﬁcally,
the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion is
stronger when the payoﬀ of the riskier choice is kept constant
compared to when it changes. Even though the overall result
of the meta-regressions suggests that the decision task used
to measure risk aversion explains a substantial amount of
the observed heterogeneity for females only, no single tasks
appeared to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion.
3.5 Descriptive Results for the Mixed Domain
A total of 41 studies published from 1993 to 2018 were
included formeta-analysis in themixed domain (N=50,936).
The mean age of participants was available for 27 studies
and ranged from 8.9 to 75.4 years with a mean of 31.9.
Participants were either university, college or high school
students in 17 of 41 studies included. Out of the remaining 24
studies 18 were based on various community samples, while
6 relied on samples of children. In 12 studies thereweremore
males than females, while the opposite was true in 18 studies.
The male to female ratio was exactly 1.00 in one study while
the proportion of males and females was not available for
10 studies. Risk aversion was measured using GPIT in 11
studies, LT in 9, and MPL in 8. ALT, BLAT, OGT and IGT
were all used to measure risk aversion in 2 studies, while
EGRT,CGT,DTB, PCT and SGGwere used in the remaining
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Figure 2: Forest plots for the domain of gains — full sample, males and females only.
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Figure 2 continued.
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5 studies. The decision task was fully incentivized in 11
studies, randomly incentivized in 14, and purely hypothetical
in 11. Moreover, participants were paid for participating in
the experiment in 31 out 41 studies. Information about
whether participants were paid for their participation and
the extent to which the decision task was incentivized was
unavailable in 10 and 5 studies, respectively. The average
payment for the whole experiment ranged from $2 to $58
with a mean of $21. However, information about the average
payment was only available for 10 studies. Cognitive ability
was measured using CATB in 19 studies, CRT in 9, RPM in
8, and NUM in 5. Finally, in 5 of the 41 studies included,
one of the primary purposes of the study was to investigate
the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion.
For an overview of studies included for meta-analysis in the
mixed domain see Table 5.
3.6 Random-Effects Model Meta-Analysis for
the Mixed Domain
Results from the random-eﬀects model meta-analysis indi-
cate no relationship between cognitive ability and risk aver-
sion in the mixed domain (k = 41, ρ = .01, Z = 0.82, p >
.05, 95% CI [−.02, .04]). The same goes for the result for
males only (k = 24, ρ = −.01, Z = −0.32, p > .05, 95% CI
[−.05, .04]). However, the result for females only suggest a
weak but signiﬁcant positive relationship between cognitive
ability and risk aversion in the mixed domain (k = 24, ρ
= .03, Z = 2.15, p < .05, 95% CI [.00, .06]). The forest
plots depicted in Figure 3 provide an overview of the in-
cluded studies, their individual correlation coeﬃcients with
95% conﬁdence intervals, and the overall results from the
random-eﬀects model meta-analyses described above.
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Figure 3: Forest plot for the mixed domain — full sample, males and females only.
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3.7 Test for Heterogeneity in the Mixed Do-
main
Results from the Q statistics were highly signiﬁcant for the
full sample (Q = 247.07, df = 40, p < .001), males (Q =
86.42, df = 23, p < .001), and females only (Q = 45.57,
df = 23, p < .01), indicating a substantial amount of true
heterogeneity among the 41 studies included in the mixed
domain. These results were further conﬁrmed by the I2
statistics which indicated that the amount of total variance
observed due to true heterogeneity was high for the full
sample (I2 = 88.49%, 95% CI [79.25, 92.88]) and males
(I2 = 80.74%, 95% CI [58.75, 92.55]), while moderate for
females (I2 = 54.65%, 95% CI [7.97, 82.23).
3.8 Moderator Analysis for the Mixed Do-
main
The overall results from the meta-regression showed that
only the cognitive ability measure and the decision task used
had an inﬂuence on the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and risk aversion in the mixed domain (Table 6). More
speciﬁcally, the relationship between cognitive ability and
risk aversion is positive when cognitive ability wasmeasured
with CATB, while increasingly negative when assessed by
RPM, CRT and NUM. Similarly, the meta-regressions sug-
gest that the relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion is positive when risk aversion was measured us-
ing ALT, while less positive and even negative when one of
the following decision tasks were utilized: CGT, MPL, IGT,
OGT, LT, GPIT, BLAT, PCT or EGRT.
For males only, the decision task used, probabilities and
whether or not there was a certain option were found to be
signiﬁcant predictors (Table 7). Speciﬁcally, the relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion is positive when
the probabilities of the decision task was changing as well
as when there was no certain option, while negative when
the opposite was true. Moreover, the relationship was found
to be increasingly positive when risk aversion was measured
using CGT and DTB.
For females only, cognitive ability measure, the decision
task used, probabilities, and whether or not there was a cer-
tain option were signiﬁcant predictors for the relationship of
interest (Table 8.). More speciﬁcally, the relationship be-
tween cognitive ability and risk aversion is positive when
cognitive ability was measured using CATB while increas-
ingly negative when assessed by RPM and CRT. Similarly,
the relationship is positive when risk aversion was measured
using ALT, while moving toward negative when using GPIT
and BLAT. Finally, the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and risk aversion is stronger when there was no certain
option and the probabilities were changing.
3.9 Descriptive Results for the Domain of
Losses
A total of 12 studies published from 2003 to 2018 were
included for meta-analysis in the domain of losses (N =
4,544). The mean age of participants was available for 11
studies and ranged from 6.0 to 68.7 years with a mean of
32.1. Participants were either university, college or high
school students in 4 of 12 studies. Out of the remaining 8
studies, 7 were based on various community samples, while
one relied on samples of children. In 6 studies there were
more males than females, while the opposite was true in 5
studies. For one study, the proportion of males and females
was not available. Risk aversion was measured using LT
in 6 studies and MPL in 2. In the remaining 4 studies risk
aversion was assessed with one of the following decision
tasks: ALT, CT, EGRT and GGT. The decision task was
fully incentivized in 2 studies and randomly incentivized in
7. Moreover, participants were paid for participation in 10
out of 12 studies. Information about whether the participants
were paid for their participation and the extent to which the
decision task was incentivized were unavailable in 2 and 3
studies, respectively. The average payment for the whole
experiment ranged from $9 to $25 with a mean of $15. The
average payment was however only available for 3 studies.
Cognitive ability was measured using CATB in 9 studies,
CRT in 2 and RPM in 1. Finally, in 4 of the 12 studies
included, one of the primary purposes of the study was to
investigate the relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion. For an overview of the studies included for meta-
analysis in the domain of losses see Table 9.
3.10 Random-Effects Model Meta-Analysis
for the Domain of Losses
Results from the random-eﬀects model meta-analysis indi-
cate no link between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the
domain of losses (k = 12, ρ = −.05, Z = −1.10, p > .05, 95%
CI [−.13, .04]). The story is the same for males only (k = 8, ρ
= −.05, Z = −0.68, p > .05, 95% CI [−.18, .09]) and females
only (k = 8, ρ = −.01, Z = −0.19, p > .05, 95% CI [−.11,
.09]). The forest plots in Figure 4 provides an overview of
the studies included, their individual correlation coeﬃcients
with 95% conﬁdence intervals, and the overall results from
the random-eﬀects model meta-analyses described above.
3.11 Test for Heterogeneity in the Domain of
Losses
The result from the Q statistics were signiﬁcant for the full
sample (Q = 50.63, df = 11, p < .001), males (Q = 29.18,
df = 7, p < .001), and females only (Q = 19.10, df = 7, p
< .01), indicating the existence of true heterogeneity. These
results were further corroborated by the I2 statistics which
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Figure 4: Forest plots in the domain of losses — full sample, males and females only
indicated that the amount of total variance observed due to
true heterogeneity was high for the full sample (I2 = 82.13%,
95% CI [56.30, 94.07]) and males (I2 = 81.15%, 95% CI
[51.46, 96.43]) as well as moderate for females (I2 =63.26%,
95% CI [8.58, 90.88]).
3.12 Moderator Analysis for the Domain of
Losses
Themeta-regressions indicate that cognitive abilitymeasure,
probabilities, and the payoﬀ structure of the riskier choice
had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the relationship between cog-
nitive ability and risk aversion in the domain of losses (Table
10). More speciﬁcally, the relationship is positive when cog-
nitive ability was measured using CRT, while increasingly
negative when measured using either CATB or RPM. Fur-
thermore, the relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion is positive when the probability was kept constant
at 50% and the payoﬀ of the riskier option did not change,
while negative when this was not the case.
Formales only, both the payoﬀ structure of the safer choice
and the decision task used to measure risk aversion were
signiﬁcant predictors of the relationship of interest (Table
11). The relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion is positive when risk aversion was measured using
MPL, while increasingly negative when assessed with either
EGRT or CT. Moreover, the relationship moved in the neg-
ative direction when the payoﬀ of the safer choice was kept
constant.
For females only, the percentage of risk averse choices,
cognitive ability measure, probabilities, sample type, and the
payoﬀ structure of the riskier choice inﬂuenced the relation-
ship between cognitive ability and risk aversion for males
only (Table 12). The result for percentage of risk averse
choices suggest that the relationship of interest moves in a
negative direction as the percentage of risk averse choices in-
creases. Moreover, the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and risk aversion is negative when cognitive ability was
measured with CATB, while going in the opposite direc-
tion when assessed by CRT. Conversely, the relationship is
positive when the probability was kept constant at 50%, the
sample consisted of students, and the payoﬀ of the riskier
choices was kept constant, while negative when this was not
the case.
3.13 Comparing Males and Females Across
the Domain of Gains, Mixed and Losses
In order to compare the results for males and females across
the domain of gains, mixed and losses, three separate meta-
regressions were performed. The results indicate no signif-
icant diﬀerences between males and females in the domain
of gains (QM (df = 1) = 2.43, p > .05), mixed (QM (df = 1) =
2.02, p >.05) or losses (QM (df = 1) = 0.19, p >.05). These
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results corroborate ﬁndings from Table 2, 6 and 10 that the
male to female ratio has no inﬂuence on the relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion in either of the
three domains.
3.14 Publication Bias
Nine funnel plots were created by plotting each eﬀect size
against the standard error of the observed eﬀect sizes for the
full sample, males and females only across all three domains
(Figure 5–7). Visual examination of each funnel plot sug-
gests that the observed eﬀect sizes are not asymmetrically
distributed around the combined eﬀect size, implying that no
publication bias exist. Furthermore, neither the rank corre-
lation test nor the regression test for funnel plot asymmetry
provides any substantial evidence of publication bias for the
full sample (Gains: τ = −.01, p > .05, Z = 0.91, p > .05;
Mixed: τ = .08, p > .05, Z = −0.97, p > .05; Losses: τ =
−.12, p > .05; Z = −2.10, p < .05), males (Gains: τ = −.06, p
> .05; Z = 0.64, p > .05; Mixed: τ = .08, p > .05; Z = −1.35,
p > .05; Losses: τ =-.36, p > .05; Z = −1.56, p > .05), and
females only (Gains: τ = .07, p > .05, Z = −0.11, p > .05;
Mixed: τ = .14, p > .05; Z = −0.56, p > .05; Losses:τ =-.14,
p > .05; Z = −1.29, p > .05) across the domain of gains,
mixed and losses.
3.15 Case Deletion Diagnostics
As shown in Figures 8–10, two studies were found to be
inﬂuential when looking at the results for the full sample
across the three decision domains. Similarly, when looking
at the results for males only, two studies were identiﬁed
as inﬂuential across the domain of gains, mixed and losses,
while four studies could be regarded as inﬂuential for females
only. The results did however not change substantially after
removing all studies identiﬁed as inﬂuential from the full
sample (Gains: k = 96, ρ = −.07, Z = −6.31, p < .001, 95%
CI [−.09, −.05]; Mixed: k = 40, ρ = .02, Z = 1.35, p > .05,
95% CI [−.01, .05]), males (Gains: k = 50, ρ = −.08, Z =
−4.94, p < .001, 95% CI [−.11, −.05]; Losses: k = 7, ρ =
.00, Z = −0.00, p > .05, 95% CI [−.11, .11]) and females
only (Gains: k = 45, ρ = −.06, Z = −4.39, p < .001, 95% CI
[−.09, −.03]; Mixed: k = 23, ρ = .02, Z = 2.28, p < .05, 95%
CI [.00, .04]).
4 Discussion
In this study a systematic review and meta-analysis was con-
ducted in order to empirically investigate the nature of the
relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. A
total of 97 studies (N=90,723)was included formeta-analysis
in the domain of gains, 41 (N=50,936) in the mixed domain
and 12 (N=4,544) in the domain of losses. The overall re-
sults from the random-eﬀects model meta-analyses suggest
that a weak, but signiﬁcant relation between cognitive abil-
ity and risk aversion exist in the domain of gains. Thus, the
current meta-analysis provides evidence that highly intelli-
gent individuals tend to be less risk averse in the domain
of gains. However, the strength of the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion was estimated to be rather
weak (ρ = −.07), and not as strong as suggested by some
previous studies. No evidence was found for a relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the mixed do-
main or the domain of losses. Taken together, these results
suggest that the relationship between cognitive ability and
risk aversion is domain speciﬁc and present only for the do-
main of gains. Given the weak nature of this relationship, we
should be cautious in drawing conclusions about its practical
signiﬁcance.
Interestingly, the relationship between cognitive ability
and risk aversion appear to be quite stable across genders.
That is, even though the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and risk aversion appears to diﬀer somewhat between
males and females for the domains of gains (ρmale = −.09;
ρ f emale = −.05), mixed (ρmale = −.01; ρ f emale = .03) and
losses (ρmale = −.05; ρ f emale = −.01), these diﬀerences
were not found to be signiﬁcant. This is important, as it sug-
gests that the observation that females tend to be more risk
averse thanmales (e.g., Charness &Gneezy, 2012; Croson&
Gneezy, 2009), is probably not driven by gender diﬀerences
in cognitive ability. Contrary, to the results from the full
sample and males only, a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion was observed
in the mixed domain for females only. This suggest that
highly intelligent females tend to be more risk averse in the
mixed domain, compared to females with lower cognitive
ability. However, as with the negative correlation observed
in the domain of gains, the relationship is very weak (ρ =
.03), and, thus, potentially not of practical signiﬁcance. No-
tably, the amount of true heterogeneity observed, were con-
sistently higher for males as compared to females across all
three domains (Gains [I2
male
= 78.48%, I2
f emale
=33.56%];
Mixed [I2
male
= 80.74%, I2
f emale
= 54.65%], Losses [I2
male
=81.15%, I2
f emale
= 63.26%]. This is an interesting result,
as it suggests that the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and risk aversion is considerably more stable and varies
less across studies for females. A possible explanation is
that males show more variability in cognitive ability than fe-
males (e.g., Arden & Plomin, 2006; Deary, 2003; Feingold,
1992; Lakin, 2013; Lohman&Lakin, 2009; Strand, Deary&
Smith, 2006). This is in line with the greater male variability
hypothesis, which states that males generally tend to diﬀer
more than females on a number of individual characteris-
tics such as personality (Borkenau, McCrae, & Terracciano,
2013), creativity (He & Wong, 2011), and cognitive abil-
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ity (Arden & Plomin, 2006; Deary, 2003; Feingold, 1992;
Lakin, 2013; Lohman & Lakin, 2009; Strand et al., 2006).
Consequently, the relationship between cognitive ability and
risk aversion might be less stable across studies for males,
because the sample ofmale participants in each study ismore
likely to vary in terms of cognitive ability. This is, likely due
to the fact that the variation between samples depends par-
tially on the amount of variability in the population from
which they are drawn (Swinscow & Campbell, 2002).
The fact that the relationship between cognitive ability
and risk aversion is non-existent or rather weak across all
three domains suggest that risk preferences may reﬂect an
independent construct which does not substantially overlap
with intelligence. This interpretation is line with the conclu-
sion drawn by Frey and colleagues (2017), who used several
risk elicitation measures to extract a latent risk preference
factor (R) which was not found to be associated with cog-
nitive ability. This is very intriguing as cognitive ability
has been found to be strongly related to how proﬁcient peo-
ple are at understanding and evaluating risk (Cokely et al.,
2012). Consequently, in some cases there appear to be a
gap between people’s ability to understand and evaluate risk,
and their willingness to take risk. This gap could potentially
have important real-world implications as it might lead some
people who have a limited understanding of risk to take on
too much of it, while others who do have the capabilities to
properly evaluate risk might take on too little.
Compared to other meta-analyses linking cognitive ability
to individual preferences, the eﬀect sizes reported here are
small. For instance, Shamosh and Gray (2008) found the
mean correlation between cognitive ability and delayed dis-
counting across 24 studies to be −.23, suggesting that highly
intelligent individuals are more patient and have higher lev-
els of self-control. Similarly, in a more recent meta-analysis
Sharma, BottomandElfenbein (2013), found a positivemean
correlation of .24 between cognitive ability and cooperative
tendencies across ﬁve studies with a total of 1,123 partici-
pants. Hence, even though cognitive ability was not found
to be strongly related to risk aversion in the present meta-
analysis, it should still be regarded as an important variable
that needs to be taken into consideration when investigating
the antecedents of human decision making.
Overall, none of the moderator variables consistently in-
ﬂuenced the relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion across the domain of gains, mixed and losses. Al-
though no clear pattern from the meta-regressions emerged,
the following ﬁve moderators were found to be inﬂuential in
more than one instance: the decision task used to measure
risk aversion, the psychometric instrument used to assess
cognitive ability, whether the payoﬀ of the riskier choice and
probabilities varied or were kept constant, and if there was a
certain option or not. Speciﬁcally, the decision task used to
measure risk aversion consistently moderate the relationship
in the mixed domain, while also moderating the relationship
in the domain of gains for females and the domain of losses
for males. This result suggest that the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion is especially sensitive to
how risk aversion is assessed in the mixed domain, while
only somewhat sensitive to this in the domain of gains and
losses.
Similarly, the psychometric measure used to assess cogni-
tive ability was found to inﬂuence the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion for the full sample and
females only in the mixed domain, and the domain of losses.
As with the results for the decision task used to measure risk
aversion, these results indicate that it somehowmatters more
how cognitive ability is assessed in the mixed domain and
the domain of losses as compared to the domain of gains.
Whether the probabilities were varied or kept constant was
not found to moderate the relationship between cognitive
ability and risk aversion in the domain of gains, but to be
somewhat inﬂuential in the mixed domain and the domain
of losses. More precisely, it was found to inﬂuence the
relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion in
the mixed domain for males and females only, as well as in
the domain of losses for the full sample and females only.
Likewise, whether or not therewas a certain optionwas found
to moderate the relationship in the mixed domain for males
and females only. In both cases, the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion is positive when there was
no certain option and less positive when the opposite was
true. Finally, whether the payoﬀof the riskier optionwas kept
constant or varied was found to moderate the relationship in
the domain of gains for females, as well as in the domain of
losses for the full sample and females only.
Collectively, these results indicate that the relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion is more sensitive
to the setup of the decision task, as well as how cognitive
ability is measured in the mixed domain and the domain of
losses.
In contrast to the results from Taylor (2013, 2016) and
Sousa and Rangel (2014), no evidence of a hypothetical
bias was observed. Hence, neither the existence nor the
strength of the relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion were found to be contingent on whether the decision
task was incentivized or not. Furthermore, contrary to the
results presented by Andersson et al. (2016), the number of
possible risk averse choices was not found to moderate the
relationship, except in the domain of losses for females only.
These results suggest that the negative relationship observed
between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the domain of
gains is most likely not just an artefact of people with low
cognitive ability making more random choice errors.
Across all three domains there was no substantial evi-
dence of publication bias when looking at the funnel plots
as well as the results from the rank correlation tests (Begg
& Mazumdar, 1994) and the regression tests (Egger et al.,
1997). Furthermore, the moderator analyses indicate that
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results were not inﬂuenced by whether or not one of the pri-
mary purposes of the studywas to investigate the relationship
between cognitive ability and risk aversion. All in all, these
results strengthen the conclusions drawn from current meta-
analysis, as they suggest that the estimated eﬀect sizes are
not considerably skewed in any direction due to publication
bias.
4.1 Limitations
This study is the ﬁrst to systematically review and synthesize
data on the relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion. Furthermore, it is the ﬁrst study that systematically
explores the circumstances under which the relationship be-
tween cognitive ability and risk aversion exist, as well as
whether speciﬁc factors moderate it. Despite these strengths,
some limitations should be acknowledged.
First, several scholars have pointed out that many of the
decision tasks most commonly used to elicit risk preferences
are subject to a considerable amount of measurement er-
ror (Crosetto & Filippin, 2016; Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni
et al., 2017). Given that the measurement error associated
with any two measures naturally impose an upper limit for
the correlation that can be expected between them (Muchin-
sky, 1996; Spearman, 1904b), it is likely that the current
meta-analysis underestimates the true strength of the rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. In light
of this fact, it would have been more appropriate to conduct
the meta-analysis using disattenuated correlations (Osborne,
2008). Unfortunately, this was not possible, because the data
needed to correct for attenuation (i.e., reliability estimates
for both the decision task and cognitive ability measure)
was rarely available or impossible to obtain. On the other
hand, it is important to note that correcting for attenuation
when the reliability estimate drops below .70 can lead to
overestimation of the strength of the relationship of interest
(Osborne, 2008). Accordingly, given that the measurement
error, associated with many of the decision tasks commonly
used to elicit risk preferences, is far from zero, correcting
for attenuation would have been problematic in the context
of the current meta-analysis.
Second, the systematic literature search as well as all the
coding and data-extraction procedures was only performed
by one individual. This is a limitation as it naturally increases
the risk of human errors (Mathes, Klaßen & Pieper, 2017).
Third, recent evidence suggest that the imputation of beta
values, proposed by Peterson and Brown (2005), could be
somewhat problematic, as it has been found to produced
overly small estimates of meta-analytic mean correlations
(Roth, Le, Oh, Van Iddekinge & Bobko, 2018). Although
this clearly presents a limitation, the meta-regressions sug-
gests that the results were not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by
whether or not Pearson’s r was imputed using the Peterson
and Brown (2005) formula. Hence, even though the im-
putation proposed by Peterson and Brown (2005) generally
tend to produce overly small estimates of meta-analytic mean
correlations (Roth et al., 2018), this does not appear to be a
severe problem in the current meta-analysis.
Finally, only a few studies were identiﬁed and included
for meta-analysis in the domain of losses, making the meta-
analytic results for this domain less convincing compared to
the results for the mixed domain and the domain of gains
(Borenstein et al., 2009). Moreover, given that the number
of studies included in domain of losses was so small (k =
12) the conclusions drawn from the meta-regressions should
be taken with extreme caution (Steel & Kammeyer-Mueller,
2002; Thompson & Higgins, 2002).
4.2 Future Directions
Although the current meta-analysis sheds light on a number
of important aspects concerning the relationship between
cognitive ability and risk aversion, there is still much work
to be done. Future studies should seek to gain a more com-
prehensive understanding of the circumstances under which
a negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk
aversion in the domain of gains exists. Looking at the results
from the meta-regressions, it is clear that the moderator vari-
ables investigated do not suﬃciently explain the high amount
of heterogeneity observed in the domain of gains. Further-
more, additional studies are needed before any deﬁnite con-
clusions about the relationship between cognitive ability and
risk aversion in the domain of losses can or should be drawn.
Another potentially fruitful line of research is to consider
the possibility that the relationship between cognitive ability
and risk aversion is nonlinear. In a recent study, Mandal
and Roe (2014) used NLSY79 and HRS to investigate this
possibility and found a quadratic pattern where respondents
with the highest and lowest cognitive ability were most risk
tolerant. This is intriguing, as it suggests that the inconsistent
ﬁndings on the relationship between cognitive ability and
risk aversion could be explained by the relationship being
nonlinear. Following Mandal and Roe (2014) future studies
should, therefore, set out to ask whether the relationship is
indeed better described as quadratic and nonlinear.
Finally, as many of the decision tasks most commonly
used to elicit risk preferences are subjected to a considerable
amount of measurement error (Crosetto & Filippin, 2016;
Frey et al., 2017; Pedroni et al., 2017), future studies should
strive to develop new and better ways of measuring indi-
vidual risk preferences. In this regard, a promising line of
research is the recent development of adaptive elicitations
tasks which have been found to reduce measurement error
and outperform standard elicitation procedures on a number
of important parameters (Chapman, Snowberg, et al., 2018;
Toubia, Johnson, Evgeniou & Delquié, 2013). Another vi-
able solution would be to use diﬀerent risk elicitation tasks
to extract a common risk factor (R), thereby increasing ac-
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curacy and reducing measurement error (Frey et al., 2017).
Extending this possibility, risk could be measured in a vari-
ety of domains, both to study eﬀects in each domain and to
extract a cross-domain general factor (e.g., Harris, Jenkins
& Glaser, 2006).
4.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, the current meta-analysis provides strong ev-
idence for a signiﬁcant but weak negative relationship be-
tween cognitive ability and risk aversion in the domain of
gains. However, no signiﬁcant relationship was found in the
mixed domain or the domain of losses, suggesting that the
relationship is domain speciﬁc. Importantly, no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence was observed between males and females across
the domain of gains, mixed and losses. Moreover, none
of the moderator variables investigated in this study consis-
tently inﬂuenced the relationship between cognitive ability
and risk aversion across all three domains. Future research
should aim to gain a deeper understanding of the relation-
ship between cognitive ability and risk aversion using more
reliable measures to elicit risk preferences.
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Figure 5: Funnel plots for the domain of gains — full sample, males and females only.
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Figure 6: Funnel plots for the mixed domain — full sample, males and females only.
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Figure 7: Funnel plots for the domain of losses — full sample, males and females only.
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Figure 8: Case deletion diagnostics for the domain of gains. (All studies identified as influential are marked with gray)
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 14, No. 3, May 2019 Cognitive ability and risk aversion 262
0
.0
0
0
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.1
5
0
.2
0
Cook´s D
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
3
5
Hat Values
−
0
.4
−
0
.2
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
DFFITS
−
0
.4
−
0
.2
0
.0
0
.2
0
.4
DFBETAS
0
.0
0
0
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.1
5
Cook´s D
	


	

	


	

	


	

	


	

Hat Values
−
	



−
	



	


	
	



	



DFFITS
−
	



−
	



	


	
	



	



DFBETAS
	


	
	
	


	

	



	
	




Cook´s D
	


	
	
	


	

	


	

	


	

	


	

	



	
Hat Values
−
	



−
	



	


	
	



	



	



DFFITS
−
	



−
	



	


	
	



	



	



DFBETAS
Full Sample Males Only Females Only
Figure 9: Case deletion diagnostics for the mixed domain. (All studies identified as influential are marked with gray)
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Figure 10: Case deletion diagnostics for the domain of losses. (All studies identified as influential are marked with gray)
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Table 1: Overview of studies included in the domain of gains.
Author Year N Male Female MF-Ratio
Avrg
Age
Sample
Type
Payment
Avrg
Pay $
CAM
Decision
Task
Certain
Option
Probabilities
Al-Ubaydli et al 2013 171 115 56 2.054 23.3 S Yes 30.00 RPM LT Yes/No Changes
Albaity et al 2014 880 367 513 0.715 NA S NA NA CRT OGT Yes Constant(0.75)
Alexy et al 2016 181 65 116 0.560 NA S NA NA CRT DTB Yes/No Changes
Alonso et al 2018 389 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA CRT MPL Yes NA
Andersson et al Study 1 2016 2333 1213 1120 1.083 46.7 CS Yes 42.00 CATB MPL No Constant(0.50)
Andersson et al Study 2 2016 1396 740 656 1.128 46.7 CS Yes 31.50 CATB MPL No Constant(0.50)
Basteck & Mantovani 2018 192 102 90 1.133 23.8 S Yes 17.35 RPM BRET No NA
Beauchamp et al 2017 3482 3482 0 NA NA CS NA NA CATB DTB Yes Changes
Ben-Ner & Halldorsson 2010 204 65 139 0.468 20.6 S Yes 27.00 CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Bendahan et al 2017 352 210 142 1.479 21.1 S Yes NA RPM OGT Yes Changes
Benjamin et al study1 2013 94 58 36 1.611 NA S Yes NA NUM LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Benjamin et al study 2 2013 81 36 45 0.800 NA S Yes NA NUM LT Yes/No Constant(0.50)
Benjamin et al study 3 2013 34 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA NUM LT Yes/No Constant(0.50)
Blankenstein et al 2016 148 71 77 0.922 16.8 S Yes NA RPM WFT Yes Changes
Booth et al 2014 219 144 75 1.920 19.0 S Yes NA RPM MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Booth et al 2016 693 334 359 0.930 48.0 CS Yes NA RPM MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Borghans & Golsteyn 2007 1631 NA NA NA NA CS NA NA CRT LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Borghans et al 2009 327 169 158 1.070 NA S Yes 24.28 RPM EURT Yes Constant(0.50)
Bosch-Rosa et al 2018 283 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA CRT MPL No Changes
Bradford et al 2017 762 352 398 0.884 44.0 CS Yes NA CRT MPL No Changes
Branas-Garza & Rustichini 2011 188 72 116 0.621 22.2 S NA NA RPM DTB Yes/No Changes
Branas-Garza et al 2014 766 355 411 0.864 37.7 CS Yes NA NUM LT Yes Changes
Branas-Garza et al 2012 191 74 117 0.632 22.2 S Yes NA CATB MPL No Changes
Breaban & Noussair 2015 128 NA NA NA NA S Yes 25.80 CRT MPL No Changes
Bruttel & Fischbacher 2013 224 95 129 0.736 NA S Yes 33.06 CRT MPL No Changes
Burks et al 2009 1009 902 107 8.430 37.3 CS Yes 53.00 CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Burks et al 2015 97 39 58 0.672 20.9 S Yes NA CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Cabrales et al 2017 124 48 76 0.632 NA S Yes 21.73 CRT MPL No Changes
Campitelli & Labollita 2010 157 47 110 0.427 24.4 CS NA NA CRT LT Yes Changes
Campos-Vazquez et al 2018 404 214 190 1.126 24.5 CS Yes 7.90 RPM MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Carpena et al 2017 1328 562 766 0.734 38.6 CS Yes NA NUM OGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Castillo 2017 1882 NA NA NA 8.0 CHS Yes NA CATB EGRT Yes Constant(0.50)
Cavatorta & Schroder 2018 99 41 58 0.707 18.3 S Yes 24.35 RPM MPL No Changes
Chapman et al (a) 2018 1000 NA NA NA NA CS Yes 9.00 CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Chapman et al (b) 2018 2000 NA NA NA NA CS Yes 9.00 CATB ALT Yes Constant(0.50)
Charness et al 2018 223 114 109 1.046 22.1 S Yes 16.00 RPM MPL Yes Constant(0.66)
Chen et al 2017 183 92 91 1.011 33.0 CS Yes 28.96 CRT MPL No Changes
Chen et al 2014 84 43 41 1.049 44.0 CS NA NA CATB CT Yes Changes
Choi et al 2018 600 181 419 0.432 38.9 CS Yes 5.02 RPM MPL Yes Constant
Corgnet et al 2016 100 53 47 1.128 NA S Yes NA CRT MPL No Changes
Csermely & Rabas 2016 96 52 44 1.182 26.3 S Yes 23.70 CRT MPL No Constant(0.50)
Cueva et al 2015 281 140 141 0.993 22.5 S Yes NA CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Cueva et al study 1 2016 384 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA CRT LT No Changes
Cueva et al study 2 2016 186 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Dave et al 2010 801 347 454 0.764 NA CS Yes 124.50 NUM DTB Yes/No Changes
Dean & Ortoleva 2012 190 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA RPM MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Deckers et al 2017 435 NA NA NA 7.8 CHS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Dohmen et al 2010 376 178 198 0.899 46.2 CS Yes NA CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Duttle & Inukai 2015 114 88 26 3.385 22.6 S Yes NA CRT LT Yes Changes
Note. Not available (NA), cognitive ability measure (CAM), student sample (S), community sample (CS), children sample (CHS), cognitive ability test
battery (CATB), ravens progressive matrices (RPM), cognitive reflection task (CRT), numeracy test (NUM), working memory capacity test (WMC),
adaptive lottery task (ALT), bomb elicitation risk task (BRET), cups task (CT), decision task battery (DTB), Eckel-Grossman risk task (EGRT), Ellsberg
urn risk task (EURT), gift gamble task (GGT), income gamble task (IGT), lottery task (LT), multiple price list (MPL), one-shot gambling task (OGT),
Sabater-Grande-Georgantzis lottery panel (SGG), wheel of fortune task (WTF).
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Table 1, continued.
Author Year N Male Female MF-Ratio
Avrg
Age
Sample
Type
Payment
Avrg.
Pay $
CAM
Decision
Task
Certain
Option
Probabilities
Frederick 2005 3150 NA NA NA NA S Yes 8.00 CRT LT Yes Changes
Frey et al 2017 1480 561 919 0.610 25.0 CS Yes NA CATB DTB No Changes
Gaurav et al 2011 597 525 72 7.292 49.8 CS Yes NA NUM OGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Gerhardt et al 2011 41 20 21 0.952 25.9 S Yes NA CRT LT Yes/No Changes
Guillen et al 2014 180 NA NA NA NA S Yes 17.16 CATB BRET No NA
Gupta et al 2013 1904 1010 894 1.130 NA CHS NA NA NUM EGRT Yes Constant(0.50)
Hefti et al 2016 672 339 333 1.018 23.1 S Yes 80.00 RPM MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Ibanez et al 2016 220 82 138 0.594 NA S Yes NA CATB SGG Yes Changes
Johnson & Pevnitskaya 2013 150 77 73 1.055 20.4 S Yes 20.40 RPM MPL No Changes
Kable et al 2017 128 71 57 1.246 25.1 CS NA NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Kirchler et al 2017 603 254 349 0.728 23.5 S Yes 12.16 CRT LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Koch & Nafziger 2016 643 284 359 0.791 21.4 S Yes 25.00 CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Kocher et al 2014 400 148 252 0.587 23.6 S Yes 21.00 CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Kurnianingsih 2015 25 11 14 0.786 68.7 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Levin & Hart 2003 30 11 19 0.579 6.0 CHS Yes NA CATB GGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Lezzi et al 2015 206 95 111 0.856 NA S Yes 12.65 NUM MPL No Changes
Mather et al 2012 157 79 78 1.013 39.0 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes/No Changes
Menapace et al 2015 99 99 0 NA 43.7 CS Yes 34.37 NUM EGRT Yes Constant(0.50)
Mollerstrom & Seim 2014 247 247 0 NA 47.2 CS NA NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Oechssler et al 2009 551 333 218 1.528 23.9 S Yes NA CRT OGT Yes Constant(0.75)
Pachur et al 2017 118 76 42 1.810 47.4 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes/No Changes
Park & Cho 2018 69 35 34 1.029 20.2 S NA NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Peters & Bjalkebring 2015 108 40 68 0.588 21.3 S Yes NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Pollak et al 2016 35 21 14 1.500 15.9 CHS NA NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Ponti et al 2014 192 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA CRT MPL No Changes
Proto et al 2014 100 38 62 0.613 21.6 S Yes 28.00 RPM MPL No Changes
Ramlall 2014 2565 1359 1206 1.127 NA CS NA NA NUM OGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Rangel & Sousa Study 1 2014 197 118 79 1.494 22.3 S Yes 18.62 CATB OGT Yes Constant
Rangel & Sousa Study 2 2014 106 50 56 0.893 19.9 S Yes 13.27 CATB MPL Yes Constant
Reuben et al 2008 498 345 153 2.255 28.3 S Yes 98.32 CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Rizzolli & Tremewan 2016 146 83 63 1.317 26.0 NA Yes NA CRT MPL No Constant(0.50)
Rydval 2012 124 58 66 0.879 NA S Yes 28.17 WMC MPL Yes NA
Sartarelli 2016 240 129 111 1.162 NA S Yes NA CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Schleich et al 2018 13436 6718 6718 1.000 40.9 CS Yes NA CRT MPL No Constant(0.50)
Sepulveda et al 2017 20 8 12 0.667 41.1 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Sheremeta 2018 184 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Stanek & Krcal 2018 149 73 76 0.961 22.7 S Yes NA CATB BRET No NA
Stewart et al 2018 937 221 716 0.309 81.2 CS NA NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Strauss et al 2016 31201 14624 16577 0.882 37.3 CS NA NA CATB IGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Suzuki et al 2018 277 66 211 0.313 26.1 CS NA NA NUM MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Sytsma et al 2014 190 147 43 3.419 21.0 S Yes NA RPM EGRT Yes Constant
Taylor 2013 98 59 39 1.513 21.8 S Yes 52.68 CATB MPL No Changes
Taylor 2016 181 89 92 0.967 21.8 S Yes NA CRT MPL Yes/No Changes
Tymula et al 2012 65 31 34 0.912 NA CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Tymula et al 2013 135 70 65 1.077 37.2 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Changes
van der Leer et al 2015 112 53 59 0.898 19.9 S Yes NA RPM MPL No Changes
Weisser 2014 115 63 52 1.212 22.8 S Yes NA CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Ziegelmeyer & Ziegelmeyer 2016 140 18 122 0.148 37.1 CS Yes NA CRT MPL No Changes
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Table 1, continued.
Author Year
Payoff
Safer
Choice
Payoff
Riskier
Choice
Incentivized
% Risk
Averse
Choices
Primary
Purpose
R-Recode R-Male-Recode
R-Female-
Recode
Imputed
Beta
Al-Ubaydli et al 2013 Changes Changes Random NA No −.280 −.260 −.280 No
Albaity et al 2014 Constant Constant NA 100 Yes −.050 NA NA No
Alexy et al 2016 Changes Changes No NA No −.012 NA NA No
Alonso et al 2018 Changes Constant Random NA No −.007 NA NA Yes
Andersson et al Study 1 2016 Constant Changes Random 80 Yes −.072 NA NA No
Andersson et al Study 2 2016 Constant Changes Random 50 Yes .059 NA NA No
Basteck & Mantovani 2018 NA NA Yes 100 No −.076 .000 −.127 No
Beauchamp et al 2017 Changes Changes No 100 No −.274 −.274 NA Yes
Ben-Ner & Halldorsson 2010 Constant Changes Random 80 No .070 NA NA Yes
Bendahan et al 2017 Constant Constant Yes 100 No .079 NA NA Yes
Benjamin et al study1 2013 Constant Changes Yes 80 Yes −.282 −.230 −.272 No
Benjamin et al study 2 2013 Constant Changes Yes 60 Yes −.116 .039 −.140 No
Benjamin et al study 3 2013 Constant Changes Yes 60 Yes −.003 NA NA No
Blankenstein et al 2016 Constant Changes Random 100 No .000 −.096 .042 No
Booth et al 2014 Changes Constant Random 80 No −.540 NA NA Yes
Booth et al 2016 Constant Changes Random 82 No −.080 −.111 −.034 No
Borghans & Golsteyn 2007 Constant Changes No NA No −.095 NA NA No
Borghans et al 2009 Changes Constant Yes 100 Yes −.151 NA NA Yes
Bosch-Rosa et al 2018 Constant Constant NA 56 No −.142 NA NA No
Bradford et al 2017 Constant Constant Random 63 No −.132 −.145 −.097 No
Branas-Garza & Rustichini 2011 Changes Changes No 78 No −.179 −.266 −.111 No
Branas-Garza et al 2014 Changes Changes No 100 No −.027 −.036 −.013 No
Branas-Garza et al 2012 Constant Constant NA 56 No −.226 −.313 −.096 No
Breaban & Noussair 2015 Constant Constant Random 56 No −.039 NA NA No
Bruttel & Fischbacher 2013 Constant Constant Random 56 No .031 .020 .142 No
Burks et al 2009 Changes Constant Random 83 No −.147 −.143 −.204 No
Burks et al 2015 Changes Constant Yes 83 Yes −.081 −.463 .103 No
Cabrales et al 2017 Constant Constant Yes 56 No −.013 −.098 .095 No
Campitelli & Labollita 2010 Changes Changes NA 100 Yes −.258 NA NA No
Campos-Vazquez et al 2018 Changes Constant Yes 50 Yes −.025 −.045 −.016 No
Carpena et al 2017 Constant Constant NA 100 No −.017 −.055 −.094 No
Castillo 2017 Constant Changes Yes 100 No .040 NA NA No
Cavatorta & Schroder 2018 Constant Constant Yes 50 No −.140 −.221 −.065 No
Chapman et al (a) 2018 Changes Constant Yes NA No .030 NA NA No
Chapman et al (b) 2018 Constant Changes Yes NA No −.210 NA NA No
Charness et al 2018 Changes Constant Random 83 No −.053 −.068 −.036 No
Chen et al 2017 Constant Constant Random 33 No −.083 −.033 −.077 No
Chen et al 2014 Constant Changes NA 67 Yes −.093 −.257 .032 No
Choi et al 2018 Changes Constant Yes 50 No −.130 −.173 −0.138 No
Corgnet et al 2016 Constant Constant Random 56 No .040 NA NA No
Csermely & Rabas 2016 Constant Changes Random 60 No .065 .177 −.094 No
Cueva et al 2015 Changes Constant Random 73 No −.181 −.181 −.111 No
Cueva et al study 1 2016 Changes Changes Random NA No −.118 NA NA Yes
Cueva et al study 2 2016 Changes Constant Random 52 No .001 NA NA Yes
Dave et al 2010 Changes Changes Random NA No −.178 NA NA Yes
Dean & Ortoleva 2012 Changes Constant Random NA No −.060 NA NA No
Deckers et al 2017 Changes Changes Yes 50 No .063 NA NA No
Dohmen et al 2010 Changes Constant Random 80 Yes −.210 −.283 −.136 No
Duttle & Inukai 2015 Constant Changes Random 100 No −.333 −.170 −.103 No
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 14, No. 3, May 2019 Cognitive ability and risk aversion 267
Table 1, continued.
Author Year
Payoff
Safer
Choice
Payoff
Riskier
Choice
Incentivized
% Risk
Averse
Choices
Primary
Purpose
R-Recode R-Male-Recode
R-Female-
Recode
Imputed
Beta
Frederick 2005 Changes Changes No 100 Yes −.220 NA NA No
Frey et al 2017 Changes Changes Random NA No .008 −.020 .033 No
Gaurav et al 2011 Constant Constant Yes 100 No −.090 NA NA No
Gerhardt et al 2011 Changes Changes Random 70 No −.235 −.260 .015 No
Guillen et al 2014 NA NA Yes 100 No −.040 NA NA No
Gupta et al 2013 Constant Changes No 100 Yes −.061 NA NA Yes
Hefti et al 2016 Changes Constant Random 79 No −.024 .050 −.038 No
Ibanez et al 2016 Constant Constant Random 100 No .226 NA NA No
Johnson & Pevnitskaya 2013 Constant Constant Yes 56 Yes −.030 NA NA No
Kable et al 2017 Constant Changes NA NA No −.013 NA NA No
Kirchler et al 2017 Changes Constant Random 80 No .006 .037 .049 No
Koch & Nafziger 2016 Changes Constant Random 52 No −.063 −.065 −.015 No
Kocher et al 2014 Changes Constant Random 50 No −.131 −.169 −.076 No
Kurnianingsih 2015 Changes Changes Random NA No −.058 NA NA No
Levin & Hart 2003 Constant Constant Yes 100 Yes .210 NA NA No
Lezzi et al 2015 Constant Constant Random 56 No −.114 NA NA Yes
Mather et al 2012 Changes Changes Random 100 No .069 .105 .071 No
Menapace et al 2015 Constant Changes NA 100 No .022 .022 NA No
Mollerstrom & Seim 2014 Changes Constant No NA No .095 .095 NA Yes
Oechssler et al 2009 Constant Constant Random 100 Yes −.191 −.159 −.169 No
Pachur et al 2017 Changes Changes Random 63 Yes .272 .201 .278 No
Park & Cho 2018 Changes Changes NA 60 Yes −.005 −.085 .130 No
Peters & Bjalkebring 2015 Changes Changes No 100 No −.068 −.060 −.010 No
Pollak et al 2016 Changes Changes No NA No −.058 .031 −.098 No
Ponti et al 2014 Constant Constant Random 56 No −.040 NA NA No
Proto et al 2014 Constant Constant Random 56 No .030 NA NA No
Ramlall 2014 Constant Constant NA 100 No .015 NA NA No
Rangel & Sousa Study 1 2014 Constant Constant Yes 100 Yes −.069 NA NA Yes
Rangel & Sousa Study 2 2014 Changes Constant Random NA Yes −.045 NA NA Yes
Reuben et al 2008 Changes Constant Random 69 No −.159 −.112 −.092 No
Rizzolli & Tremewan 2016 Constant Changes Random 50 No .093 .036 .120 No
Rydval 2012 Constant Changes No NA No −.122 NA NA Yes
Sartarelli 2016 Changes Constant Random 52 No −.194 NA NA No
Schleich et al 2018 Constant Changes Random 50 No −.061 −.068 −.057 No
Sepulveda et al 2017 Changes Changes Yes NA No −.066 .052 −.367 No
Sheremeta 2018 Changes Constant Random 60 No −.015 NA NA No
Stanek & Krcal 2018 NA NA Yes 100 No .021 .076 −.027 No
Stewart et al 2018 Constant Changes No 90 Yes −.180 NA NA No
Strauss et al 2016 Constant Changes No 100 No −.070 −.097 −.034 No
Suzuki et al 2018 Changes Constant NA 63 No −.109 .147 −.208 No
Sytsma et al 2014 Constant Changes NA NA No −.090 −.097 .089 Yes
Taylor 2013 Changes Changes Random 56 Yes −.010 NA NA Yes
Taylor 2016 Changes Constant Random NA Yes −.017 NA NA Yes
Tymula et al 2012 Constant Changes Random NA No −.052 NA NA Yes
Tymula et al 2013 Constant Changes Random NA No −.217 NA NA No
van der Leer et al 2015 Constant Constant NA 56 No .049 .182 −.060 No
Weisser 2014 Changes Constant No 55 No −.137 −.175 −.071 No
Ziegelmeyer & Ziegelmeyer 2016 Constant Constant Yes 56 No −.127 .014 −.165 No
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Table 2: Moderator analysis for the domain of gains.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
MF-Ratio Intercept 78 −.06** .02 [−.10, −.02] QM (df = 1) = 1.74 QE (df = 76) = 287.08***
MF-Ratio −.01 .01 [−.03, .01]
Age Intercept 66 −.06 .04 [−.14, .02] QM (df = 1) = 0.12 QE (df = 64) = 255.19***
Avrg. age −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Sample Type Intercept (CHS) 96 .02 .06 [−.09, .13] QM (df = 2) = 3.22 QE (df = 93) = 570.21***
CS −.10 .06 [−.21, .02]
S −.10 .06 [−.22, .01]
Avrg. Payment Intercept 34 −.06* .03 [−.11, −.01] QM (df = 1) = 0.70 QE (df = 32) = 177.51***
Avrg. payment −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 97 −.05* .02 [−.09, −.01] QM (df = 4) = 3.20 QE (df = 92) = 599.10***
CRT −.04 .03 [−.10, .02]
NUM −.03 .04 [−.11, .05]
RPM −.05 .04 [−.12, .02]
WMC −.08 .14 [−.34, .19]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 97 −.21* .10 [−.41, −.02] QM (df = 12) = 14.73 QE (df = 84) = 419.39***
BRET .18 .12 [−.06, .42]
CT .12 .18 [−.23, .47]
DTB .08 .11 [−.14, .29]
EGRT .19 .11 [−.03, .41]
EURT .06 .15 [−.23, .35]
GGT .43 .24 [−.04, .89]
IGT .14 .14 [−.13, .42]
LT .13 .10 [−.07, .33]
MPL .13 .10 [−.06, .33]
OGT .17 .11 [−.04, .38]
SGG .44** .15 [.14, .75]
WFT .21 .16 [−.10, .53]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 97 −.05 .02 [−09, .00] QM (df = 2) = 2.19 QE (df = 94) = 589.20***
Yes −.04 .03 [−.10, .01]
Yes/No −.03 .05 [−.12, .07]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 92 −.08*** .02 [−.12, −.04] QM (df = 4) = 0.42 QE (df = 87) = 530.28***
Constant −.01 .07 [−.14, .12]
Constant (50%) .00 .03 [−.05, .06]
Constant (66%) .02 .13 [−.22, .27]
Constant (75%) −.04 .08 [−.20, .12]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 94 −.09*** .02 [−.13, −.06] QM (df = 1) = 2.07 QE (df = 92) = 539.77***
Constant .04 .02 [−.01, .08]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 94 −.08*** .02 [−.12, −.04] QM (df = 1) = 0.13 QE (df = 92) = 603.39***
Constant .01 .03 [−.04, .06]
Incentivized Intercept (No) 84 −.11*** .03 [−.17, −.05] QM (df = 2) = 1.62 QE (df = 81) = 543.61***
Random .04 .04 [−.03, .11]
Yes .05 .04 [−.03, .13]
Risk Averse Choices Intercept 76 −.04 .06 [−.15, .07] QM (df = 1) = 0.39 QE (df = 74) = 512.13***
Risk Averse Choices % −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 97 −.07*** .01 [−.10, −.04] QM (df = 1) = 0.18 QE (df = 95) = 602.08***
Yes −.01 .03 [−.07, .04]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 97 −.07*** .01 [−.10, −.04] QM (df = 1) = 0.68 QE (df = 95) = 553.28***
Yes −.03 .03 [−.09, .03]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***.
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Table 3: Moderator analysis for the domain of gains — males only.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
Sample Type Intercept (CHS) 50 .03 .25 [−.46, .53] QM (df = 2) = 0.54 QE (df = 47) = 207.70***
CS −.11 .25 [−.61, .39]
S −.13 .25 [−.63, .37]
Avrg. Payment Intercept 17 −.07 .04 [−.15, .01] QM (df = 1) = 0.01 QE (df = 15) = 26.94*
Avrg. payment .00 .00 [−.00, .00]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 51 −.11*** .03 [−.17, −.05] QM (df = 3) = 2.00 QE (df = 47) = 184.89***
CRT .03 .04 [−.05, .12]
NUM .09 .06 [−.04, .21]
RPM .02 .05 [−.07, .12]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 51 −.10 .15 [−.39, .20] QM (df = 8) = 7.46 QE (df = 42) = 107.15***
BRET .13 .18 [−.22, .48]
CT −.17 .23 [−.63, .29]
DTB −.08 .16 [−.40, .23]
EGRT .05 .17 [−.29, .39]
IGT −.00 .17 [−.34, .34]
LT .07 .15 [−.23, .37]
MPL .00 .15 [−.30, .30]
OGT −.01 .17 [−.33, .32]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 51 −.04 .04 [−.11, .03] QM (df = 2) = 2.40 QE (df = 48) = 189.04***
Yes −.06 .04 [−.15, .02]
Yes/No −.03 .07 [−.17, .12]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 49 −.11*** .03 [−.17, −.04] QM (df = 4) = 1.55 QE (df = 44) = 144.95***
Constant −.03 .09 [−.21, .15]
Constant (50%) .03 .04 [−.04, 0.11]
Constant (66%) .04 .14 [−.23, .30]
Constant (75%) −.05 .11 [−.27, .16]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 49 −.09*** .02 [−.14, −.05] QM (df = 1) = 0.05 QE (df = 47) = 174.32***
Constant .01 .04 [−.06, .08]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 49 −.09** .03 [−.14, −.03] QM (df = 1) = 0.01 QE (df = 47) = 205.81***
Constant −.00 .04 [−.08, .07]
Incentivized Intercept (No) 43 −.11** .04 [−.20, −.03] QM (df = 2) = 0.57 QE (df = 40) = 175.67***
Random .03 .05 [−.06, .13]
Yes .01 .06 [−.12, .14]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept 45 −.05 .07 [−.19, .09] QM (df = 1) = 0.35 QE (df = 43) = 174.06***
Risk averse choices % −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 51 −.08*** .02 [−0.11, −.04] QM (df = 1) = 1.66 QE (df = 49) = 209.40***
Yes −.07 .05 [−.17, .03]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 51 −.08*** .02 [−.12, −.05] QM (df = 1) = 0.40 QE (df = 49) = 119.74***
Yes −.04 .06 [−.16, .08]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***.
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Table 4: Moderator analysis for the domain of gains — females only.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
Sample Type Intercept (CHS) 47 −.10 .30 [−.69, .50] QM (df = 2) = 0.41 QE (df = 44) = 58.72
CS .04 .30 [−.56, .63]
S .05 .30 [−.54, .65]
Avrg. Payment Intercept 16 −.04 .04 [−.11, .03] QM (df = 1) = 0.14 QE (df = 14) = 20.26
Avrg. payment −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 48 −.03 .02 [−.07, .01] QM (df = 3) = 3.80 QE (df = 44) = 52.09
CRT −.02 .03 [−.08, .04]
NUM −.07 .04 [−.15, .00]
RPM −.04 .03 [−.11, .03]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 48 .04 .12 [−.19, .27] QM (df = 8) = 17.09* QE (df = 39) = 43.29
BRET −.12 .14 [−.40, .15]
CT −.01 .20 [−.40, .38]
DTB −.02 .12 [−.26, .21]
EGRT .05 .20 [−.34, .43]
IGT −.08 .12 [−.30, .15]
LT −.05 .12 [−.28, .19]
MPL −.10 .12 [−.33, .12]
OGT −.15 .12 [−.39, .08]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 48 −.04 .02 [−.08, .01] QM (df = 2) = 0.95 QE (df = 45) = 60.16
Yes −.03 .03 [−.08, .03]
Yes/No −.01 .06 [−.13, .11]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 46 −.02 .02 [−.06, .02] QM (df = 4) = 7.01 QE (df = 41) = 51.20
Constant −.10 .06 [−.21, .01]
Constant (50%) −.04 .02 [−.09, .01]
Constant (66%) −.02 .10 [−.22, .18]
Constant (75%) −.15* .08 [−.30, −.01]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 46 −.05** .02 [−.08, −.01] QM (df = 1) = 0.07 QE (df = 44) = 59.72
Constant −.01 .03 [−.06, .04]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes 46 −.03 .02 [−.06, .00] QM (df = 1) = 4.35* QE (df = 44) = 53.66
Constant −.05* .02 [−.09, −.00]
Incentivized Intercept (No) 41 −.04 .03 [−.09, .01] QM (df = 2) = 1.86 QE (df = 38) = 46.26
Random −.01 .03 [−.06, .05]
Yes −.05 .04 [−.13, .03]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept 43 −.07* .04 [−.15, −.00] QM (df = 1) = 0.28 QE (df = 41) = 46.96
Risk averse choices % .00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 48 −.05*** .01 [−.08, −.03] QM (df = 1) = 0.15 QE (df = 46) = 59.72
Yes −.02 .04 [−.09, .06]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 48 −.05*** .01 [−.08, −.03] QM (df = 1) = 0.77 QE (df = 46) = 59.68
Yes .14 .16 [−.18, .46]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***.
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Table 5: Overview of studies included in the mixed domain.
Author Year N Male Female MF-Ratio
Avrg
Age
Sample
Type
Payment
Avrg
Pay $
CAM
Decision
Task
Certain
Option
Probabilities
Alan et al 2014 1550 812 738 1.100 NA CHS Yes NA RPM GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Alan et al study 1 2017 375 375 0 NA NA CHS Yes NA CATB GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Alan et al study 2 2017 311 0 311 NA NA CHS Yes NA CATB GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Alexy et al 2016 181 65 116 0.560 NA S NA NA CRT SGG Yes Changes
Angerer et al 2015 636 361 275 1.313 8.9 CHS Yes NA RPM GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Bateman el al 2015 1199 NA NA NA NA CS Yes 2.10 NUM PCT Yes Constant
Benjamin et al Study 1 2013 94 58 36 1.611 NA S Yes NA NUM LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Branas-Garza & Rustichini 2011 192 74 117 0.632 22.2 S NA NA RPM OGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Branas-Garza et al 2014 766 355 411 0.864 37.7 CS Yes NA NUM OGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Breaban & Noussair 2015 128 NA NA NA NA S Yes 25.80 CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
NLSY79 1993 8548 4219 4329 0.975 31.9 CS NA NA CATB IGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Burks et al 2009 1009 902 107 8.430 37.3 CS Yes 58.00 CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Campos-Vazquez et al 2018 5626 2240 3386 0.662 28.0 CS NA NA RPM GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Chapman et al (a) 2018 1000 NA NA NA NA CS Yes 9.00 CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Chapman et al (b) 2018 2000 NA NA NA NA CS Yes 9.00 CATB ALT Yes Constant(0.50)
Choi et al 2014 1014 552 462 1.195 53.7 CS Yes NA CRT BLAT Yes Constant(0.50)
Dean & Ortoleva 2012 190 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA RPM MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Diaz & Forero 2013 31 31 0 NA 17.0 S NA NA RPM LT Yes Changes
Drichoutis 2017 178 59 119 0.496 21.3 S Yes NA RPM BLAT Yes Constant(0.50)
Frey et al 2017 1479 560 919 0.609 25.0 CS Yes NA CATB DTB No Changes
Goh et al 2016 137 67 70 0.957 75.4 CS NA NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Golman et al 2015 102 48 54 0.889 24.8 S Yes NA NUM GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Grohman et al 2015 530 276 254 1.087 34.6 CS NA NA NUM GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
He et al 2010 572 260 312 0.833 20.5 S Yes NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
HRS 2014 9720 4116 5604 0.734 58.9 CS NA NA CATB IGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Horn & Kiss 2018 242 82 144 0.569 NA S Yes NA CRT GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Kirchler et al 2017 601 252 349 0.722 23.5 S Yes 12.16 CRT LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Kiss et al 2016 60 30 30 1.000 NA S Yes NA CRT GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Koch & Nafziger 2016 643 284 359 0.791 21.4 S Yes 25 CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Kocher et al 2018 379 151 228 0.662 24.0 S Yes 21.32 RPM LT No Changes
Kremer et al 2014 147 70 77 0.909 31.4 CS Yes NA CATB GPIT Yes Constant(0.50)
Li et al 2013 336 115 221 0.520 45.6 CS Yes NA CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Li et al 2015 478 195 283 0.689 46.6 CS Yes 30 CATB ALT NA Changes
Pachur et al 2017 118 76 42 1.810 47.4 CS Yes NA CATB LT No Changes
Platt & Parson 2017 7769 3885 3884 1.000 14.3 CHS NA NA CATB CGT No Changes
Pollak et al 2016 35 21 14 1.500 15.9 CHS NA NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Rangel & Sousa 2014 197 118 79 1.494 22.3 S Yes 18.62 CATB EGRT Yes Constant(0.50)
Sheremeta 2018 184 NA NA NA NA S Yes NA CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Stango et al 2017 1505 NA NA NA NA CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Constant(0.50)
van der Heijden et al 2012 562 304 258 1.178 47.8 CS Yes NA CRT GPIT Yes Constant(0.33)
Weisser 2014 112 60 52 1.154 22.8 S Yes NA CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Note. Not available (NA), cognitive ability measure (CAM), student sample (S), community sample (CS), children sample (CHS), cognitive ability test
battery (CATB), ravens progressive matrices (RPM), cognitive reflection task (CRT), numeracy test (NUM), adaptive lottery task (ALT), budget line
allocation task (BLAT), Cambridge gamble task (CGT), decision task battery (DTB), Eckel-Grossman risk task (EGRT), Gneezy Potters investment task
(GPIT), income gamble task (IGT), lottery task (LT), multiple price list (MPL), one-shot gambling task (OGT), portfolio choice task (PCT), Sabater-
Grande-Georgantzis lottery panel (SGG).
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Table 5, continued
Author Year
Payoff
Safer
Choice
Payoff
Riskier
Choice
Incentivized
% Risk
Averse
Choices
Primary
Purpose
R-Recode R-Male-Recode R-Female-Recode
Imputed-
Beta
Alan et al 2014 Changes Changes Yes 100 No .027 .046 −.001 No
Alan et al study 1 2017 Changes Changes Yes 100 No −.032 −.032 NA Yes
Alan et al study 2 2017 Changes Changes Yes 100 No −.017 NA −.017 Yes
Alexy et al 2016 Changes Changes No 100 No .037 NA NA No
Angerer et al 2015 Changes Changes Yes 100 No −.022 −.026 −.017 No
Bateman el al 2015 Constant Constant No 100 No −.086 NA NA Yes
Benjamin et al Study 1 2013 Constant Changes Yes 80 Yes −.057 −.104 −.098 No
Branas-Garza & Rustichini 2011 Constant Constant No 100 No −.014 −.106 .045 No
Branas-Garza et al 2014 Constant Constant No 100 No .020 −.065 .117 No
Breaban & Noussair 2015 Constant Changes Random 83 No .099 NA NA No
NLSY79 1993 Constant Changes No 100 No .003 −.028 .038 No
Burks et al 2009 Changes Constant Random 58 Yes .150 NA NA Yes
Campos-Vazquez et al 2018 Changes Changes NA 100 Yes −.005 −.017 .007 No
Chapman et al (a) 2018 Changes Constant Yes NA No .040 NA NA No
Chapman et al (b) 2018 Constant Changes Yes NA No .210 NA NA No
Choi et al 2014 Changes Changes Random 100 No −.097 −.121 −.054 No
Dean & Ortoleva 2012 Constant Changes Random NA No −.020 NA NA No
Diaz & Forero 2013 Changes Changes Yes 100 No .010 NA NA No
Drichoutis 2017 Changes Changes Yes 100 No −.007 .038 −.037 No
Frey et al 2017 Changes Changes Random NA No .151 .222 .106 No
Goh et al 2016 Constant Changes NA NA No −.149 −.312 .002 No
Golman et al 2015 Changes Changes Random 100 No .030 NA NA No
Grohman et al 2015 Changes Changes NA 100 No −.130 NA NA No
He et al 2010 Constant Changes Random 88 No −.008 NA NA No
HRS 2014 Constant Changes No 100 No .017 −.003 .028 No
Horn & Kiss 2018 Changes Changes Random 100 No −.266 −.258 −.161 No
Kirchler et al 2017 Constant Changes Random 80 No .019 .093 .006 No
Kiss et al 2016 Changes Changes Random 100 No .099 .069 .195 No
Koch & Nafziger 2016 Changes Constant Random 52 No −.006 −.006 −.005 No
Kocher et al 2018 Changes Changes Random 50 No .010 .045 .029 No
Kremer et al 2014 Changes Changes Yes 100 No .168 .129 .216 No
Li et al 2013 Changes Changes No NA No −.013 NA NA No
Li et al 2015 Changes Changes NA NA No .220 NA NA No
Pachur et al 2017 Changes Changes Random 69 Yes .064 −.009 .074 No
Platt & Parson 2017 Changes Changes NA 100 No .080 .080 .100 No
Pollak et al 2016 Constant Changes No 100 No −.032 −.021 −.048 No
Rangel & Sousa 2014 Constant Changes No 100 Yes −.122 NA NA Yes
Sheremeta 2018 Constant Changes Random 66 No .030 NA NA No
Stango et al 2017 Constant Constant No 100 No .020 NA NA Yes
van der Heijden et al 2012 Changes Changes Yes 100 No −.022 −.020 −.027 No
Weisser 2014 Changes Constant No 37 No −.036 −.138 .157 No
Note. Not available (NA), cognitive ability measure (CAM), student sample (S), community sample (CS), children sample (CHS), cognitive ability test
battery (CATB), ravens progressive matrices (RPM), cognitive reflection task (CRT), numeracy test (NUM), adaptive lottery task (ALT), budget line
allocation task (BLAT), Cambridge gamble task (CGT), decision task battery (DTB), Eckel-Grossman risk task (EGRT), Gneezy Potters investment task
(GPIT), income gamble task (IGT), lottery task (LT), multiple price list (MPL), one-shot gambling task (OGT), portfolio choice task (PCT), Sabater-
Grande-Georgantzis lottery panel (SGG).
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Table 6: Moderator analysis for the mixed domain.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
MF-Ratio Intercept 31 −.01 .02 [−.06, .03] QM (df = 1) = 2.21 QE (df = 29) = 144.63***
MF-Ratio .02 .01 [−.01, .04]
Age Intercept 27 .04 .04 [−.05, .12] QM (df = 1) = 0.30 QE (df = 25) = 125.88***
Avrg. age −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Sample Type Intercept (CHS) 41 .01 .04 [−.07, .09] QM (df = 2) = 2.13 QE (df = 38) = 228.29***
CS .02 .05 [−.07, .11]
S −.03 .05 [−.12, .07]
AvrgP˙ayment Intercept 10 −.00 .06 [−.12, .12] QM (df = 1) = 1.49 QE (df = 8) = 92.71***
Avrg. payment .00 .00 [−.00, .01]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 41 .05** .02 [.02, .09] QM (df = 3) = 9.33* QE (df = 37) = 186.56***
CRT −.09* .04 [−.16, −.01]
NUM −.11* .05 [−.20, −.02]
RPM −.06 .04 [−.13, .02]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 41 .22*** .04 [.14, .29] QM (df = 11) = 53.13 *** QE (df = 29) = 54.88**
BLAT −.29*** .06 [−.41, −.17]
CGT −.14* .06 [−.25, −.02]
DTB −.06 .06 [−.19, .06]
EGRT −.34*** .09 [−.52, −.16]
GPIT −.24*** .04 [−.33, −.16]
IGT −.21*** .05 [−.30, −.11]
LT −.22*** .05 [−.31, −.13]
MPL −.17*** .05 [−.26, −.09]
OGT −.21*** .06 [−.33, −.09]
PCT −.30*** .06 [−.43, −.18]
SGG −.18 .09 [−.37, .01]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 40 .08* .04 [.00, .17] QM (df = 1) = 3.63 QE (df = 38) = 183.15***
Yes −.09 .05 [−.17, .00]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 41 .08* .04 [.01, .15] QM (df = 3) = 5.03 QE (df = 37) = 183.67***
Constant −.16 .09 [−.34, .01]
Constant (33%) −.10 .10 [−.29, .09]
Constant (50%) −.07 .04 [−.15, .00]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 41 .02 .02 [−.02, .06] QM (df = 1) = 0.14 QE (df = 39) = 243.44***
Constant −.01 .03 [−.08, .05]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 41 .01 .02 [−.02, .05] QM (df = 1) = 0.01 QE (df = 39) = 246.45***
Constant .00 .04 [−.07, .08]
Incentivized Intercept (No) 36 −.01 .03 [−.07, .04] QM (df = 2) = 1.52 QE (df = 33) = 158.79***
Random .03 .04 [−.04, .10]
Yes .05 .04 [−.03, .13]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept .11 .07 [−.04, .25] QM (df = 1) = 2.36 QE (df = 32) = 119.93***
Risk averse choices % 34 −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 41 .01 .02 [−.02, .04] QM (df = 1) = 0.02 QE (df = 39) = 245.51***
Yes .01 .05 [−.09, .10]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 41 .02 .02 [−.02, .05] QM (df = 1) = 0.30 QE (df = 39) = 245.02***
Yes −.02 .04 [−.11, .06]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***
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Table 7: Moderator Analysis for the Mixed Domain — Males Only.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
Sample Type Intercept (CHS) 24 .02 .05 [−.07, .11] QM (df = 2) = 0.65 QE (df = 21) = 66.29***
CS −.03 .06 [−.14, .07]
S −.05 .06 [−.17, .07]
Avrg. Payment Intercept 3 .19 .14 [−.08, .45] QM (df = 1) = 1.25 QE (df = 1) = 0.06
Avrg. payment −.01 .01 [−.02, .01]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 24 .03 .03 [−.04, .09] QM (df = 3) = 2.77 QE (df = 20) = 75.96***
CRT −.08 .05 [−.18, .03]
NUM −.10 .09 [−.27, .07]
RPM −.03 .05 [−.13, .08]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 24 −.07 .05 [−.17, .02] QM (df = 7) = 53.31*** QE (df = 16) = 22.82
BLAT −.03 .06 [−.16, .09]
CGT .15** .05 [.05, .26]
DTB .30*** .07 [.17, .43]
GPIT .06 .05 [−.04, .17]
IGT .06 .05 [−.04 .16]
LT .08 .06 [−.05, .20]
MPL .04 .07 [−.10, .19]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 24 .11*** .03 [.05, .18] QM (df = 1) = 14.40*** QE (df = 22) = 40.44**
Yes −.14*** .04 [−.21, −.07]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 24 .08* .04 [.00, .15] QM (df = 2) = 5.86* QE (df = 21) = 45.54**
Constant (33%) −.10 .09 [−.27 .08]
Constant (50%) −.10* .04 [−.19, −.02]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 24 .01 .03 [−.04, .06] QM (df = 1) = 1.13 QE (df = 22) = 73.78***
Constant −.05 .05 [−.14, .04]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 24 .00 .02 [−.04, .05] QM (df = 1) = 1.10 QE (df = 22) = 83.41***
Constant −.06 .06 [−.18, .06]
Incentivized Intercept (No) 21 −.04 .04 [−.13, .04] QM (df = 2) = 1.21 QE (df = 18) = 49.92***
Random .06 .06 [−.05, .18]
Yes .05 .06 [−.07, .16]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept 22 .01 .10 [−.19, .21] QM (df = 1) = 0.03 QE (df = 20) = 52.62***
Risk averse choices % −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 24 −.00 .02 [−.05, .04] QM (df = 1) = 0.14 QE (df = 22) = 84.38***
Yes −.03 .07 [−.16, .11]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 24 −.01 .02 [−.05, .04] QM (df = 1) = 0.07 QE (df = 22) = 85.78***
Yes −.03 .10 [−.22, .17]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***
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Table 8: Moderator analysis for the mixed domain — females only.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
Sample Type Intercept (CHS) 24 .04 .03 [−.02, .09] QM (df = 2) = 1.35 QE (df = 21) = 36.04*
CS .00 .03 [−.06, .07]
S −.04 .04 [−.12, .04]
Avrg. Payment Intercept 3 .01 .12 [−.21, .24] QM (df = 1) = 0.00 QE (df = 1) = 0.16
Avrg. payment −.00 .01 [−.01, .01]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 24 .06*** .01 [.03, .09] QM (df = 3) = 10.72* QE (df = 20) = 28.22
CRT −.08** .03 [−.14, −.02]
NUM .04 .06 [−.07, .15]
RPM −.05* .03 [−.11, −.00]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 24 .10* .04 [.02, .19] QM (df = 7) = 34.15*** QE (df = 16) = 11.42
BLAT −.15* .06 [−.27, −.03]
CGT −.00 .05 [−.09, .09]
DTB .00 .05 [−.10, .11]
GPIT −.10* .05 [−.19, −.01]
IGT −.07 .04 [−.16, .02]
LT −.09 .06 [−.20, .02]
MPL −.09 .07 [−.22, .04]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 24 .10*** .01 [.07, .13] QM (df = 1) = 23.32*** QE (df = 22) = 22.25
Yes −.08*** .02 [−.11, −.05]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 24 .10*** .01 [.07, .12] QM (df = 2) = 23.33*** QE (df = 21) = 22.25
Constant (33%) −.12 .06 [−.25, .00]
Constant (50%) −.08*** .02 [−.11, −.04]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 24 .02 .02 [−.01, .06] QM (df = 1) = 0.23 QE (df = 22) = 45.18**
Constant .01 .03 [−.04, .07]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 24 .02 .01 [−.01, .05] QM (df = 1) = 0.86 QE (df = 22) = 44.96**
Constant .04 .04 [−.04, .12]
Incentivized Intercept (No) 21 .05* .02 [.00, .09] QM (df = 2) = 2.22 QE (df = 18) = 23.48
Random −.03 .03 [−.10, .03]
Yes −.05 .04 [−.12, .02]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept 22 .02 .09 [−.15, .20] QM (df = 1) = 0.00 QE (df = 20) = 40.84**
Risk averse choices % −.00 .00 [−.00, .00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 24 .03* .01 [.00, .06] QM (df = 1) = 0.36 QE (df = 22) = 41.46**
Yes −.03 .04 [−.11, .06]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 24 .03* .01 [.00, .06] QM (df = 1) = 0.46 QE (df = 22) = 44.62**
Yes −.05 .07 [−.19, .09]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***.
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Table 9: Overview of studies included for the domain of losses.
Author Year N Male Female MF-Ratio
Avrg
Age
Sample
Type
Payment
Avrg
Pay $
CAM
Decision
Task
Certain
Option
Probabilities
Chapman et al (a) 2018 1000 NA NA NA NA CS Yes 9.00 CATB MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Chen et al 2014 84 43 41 1.049 44.0 CS NA NA CATB CT Yes Changes
Frey et al 2017 1482 563 919 0.613 25.0 CS Yes NA CATB ALT No Changes
Kirchler et al 2017 603 253 350 0.723 23.5 S Yes 12.16 CRT LT Yes Constant(0.50)
Koch & Nafziger 2016 643 284 359 0.791 21.4 S Yes 25.00 CRT MPL Yes Constant(0.50)
Kurnianingsih 2015 33 14 19 0.737 68.7 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Levin & Hart 2003 30 11 19 0.579 6.0 CHS Yes NA CATB GGT Yes Constant(0.50)
Mather et al 2012 157 79 78 1.013 39.0 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes/No Changes
Pachur et al 2017 118 76 42 1.810 47.4 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes/No Changes
Park & Cho 2018 69 35 34 1.029 20.2 S NA NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Sytsma et al 2014 190 147 43 3.419 21.0 S Yes NA RPM EGRT Yes Constant
Tymula et al 2013 135 70 65 1.077 37.2 CS Yes NA CATB LT Yes Changes
Note. Not available (NA), cognitive ability measure (CAM), student sample (S), community sample (CS), children sample (CHS),
cognitive ability test battery (CATB), ravens’ progressive matrices (RPM), cognitive reﬂection task (CRT), multiple price list (MPL), cups
task (CT), adaptive lottery task (ALT), lottery task (LT), gift gambling task (GGT), Eckel-Grossman risk task (EGRT).
Table 9, continued
Author Year
Payoﬀ
Safer
Choice
Payoﬀ
Riskier
Choice
Incentivized
% Risk
Averse
Choices
Primary
Purpose
R-Recode
R-Male-
Recode
R-Female-
Recode
Imputed-
Beta
Chapman et al (a) 2018 Changes Constant Yes NA No −.015 NA NA No
Chen et al 2014 Constant Changes NA 67 Yes −.237 −.449 −.213 No
Frey et al 2017 Changes Changes Random NA No −.052 .006 −.063 No
Kirchler et al 2017 Changes Constant Random 40 No .157 .037 .163 No
Koch & Nafziger 2016 Changes Constant Random 52 No .122 .175 .073 No
Kurnianingsih 2015 Changes Changes Random NA No −.182 NA NA No
Levin & Hart 2003 Constant Constant Yes 100 Yes −.250 NA NA No
Mather et al 2012 Changes Changes Random 100 No −.060 .086 −.111 No
Pachur et al 2017 Changes Changes Random 50 Yes −.159 −.026 −.189 No
Park & Cho 2018 Changes Changes NA 60 Yes −.055 −.100 −.030 No
Sytsma et al 2014 Constant Changes NA NA No −.230 −.255 .003 Yes
Tymula et al 2013 Constant Changes Random NA No .055 NA NA Yes
Note. Not available (NA).
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Table 10: Moderator analysis for the domain of losses.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
MF-Ratio Intercept 11 .06 .07 [−.08, .21] QM (df = 1) = 3.49 QE (df = 9) = 38.71***
MF-Ratio −.09 .05 [−.19, .00]
Age Intercept 11 .04 .12 [−.19, .27] QM (df = 1) = 0.70 QE (df = 9) = 44.08***
Avrg. age −.00 .00 [−.01, .00]
Sample Type Intercept (CHS) 12 −.26 .22 [−.69, .18] QM (df = 2) = 2.14 QE (df = 9) = 32.01***
CS .18 .23 [−.27, .63]
S .28 .23 [−.18, .73]
Avrg. Payment Intercept 3 .00 .16 [−.31, .31] QM (df = 1) = 0.34 QE (df = 1) = 8.96**
Avrg. payment .01 .01 [−.01, .02]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 12 −.05** .02 [−.08, −.01] QM (df = 2) = 41.50*** QE (df = 9) = 9.13
CRT .19*** .03 [.12, .25]
RPM −.19* .08 [−.33, −.04]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 12 −.05 .11 [−.27, .16] QM (df = 5) = 6.61 QE (df = 6) = 23.61***
CT −.19 .19 [−.56, .18]
EGRT −.18 .17 [−.51, .15]
GGT −.20 .25 [−.68, .28]
LT .04 .12 [−.20, .29]
MPL .10 .14 [−.16, .37]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 12 −.05 .13 [−.32, .21] QM (df = 2) = 0.34 QE (df = 9) = 41.16***
Yes .02 .15 [−.27, .30]
Yes/No −.06 .18 [−.40, .29]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 12 −.08 .04 [−.16, .00] QM (df = 2) = 10.36** QE (df = 9) = 22.59**
Constant −.16 .11 [−.37, .06]
Constant (50%) .15* .06 [.03, .27]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 12 −.00 .04 [−.09, .08] QM (df = 1) = 2.96 QE (df = 10) = 40.93***
Constant −.15 .09 [−.32, .02]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 12 −.10* .04 [−.18, −.02] QM (df = 1) = 7.05** QE (df = 10) = 27.71**
Constant .17** .06 [.04, .30]
Incentivized Intercept (Random) 9 .01 .05 [−.08, .11] QM (df = 1) = 0.47 QE (df = 7) = 33.48***
Yes −.07 .11 [−.29, .14]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept 7 .21 .18 [−.15, .57] QM (df = 1) = 1.91 QE (df = 5) = 15.78**
Risk averse choices % −.00 .00 [−.01, .00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 12 −.00 .04 [−.09, .08] QM (df = 1) = 3.27 QE (df = 10) = 42.34***
Yes −.17 .09 [−.34, .01]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 12 −.04 .05 [−.13, .06] QM (df = 1) = 0.29 QE (df = 10) = 46.45***
Yes −.06 .11 [−.28, .16]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***
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Table 11: Moderator analysis for the domain of losses — males only.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
Sample Type Intercept (S) 8 −.02 .10 [−.23, .18] QM (df = 1) = 0.13 QE (df = 6) = 28.58***
CS −.05 .15 [−.34, .24]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 8 −.07 .07 [−.21, .08] QM (df = 2) = 4.77 QE (df = 5) = 12.64*
CRT .17 .12 [−.06, .41]
RPM −.19 .16 [−.52, .13]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 8 .01 .04 [−.08, .09] QM (df = 4) = 28.18*** QE (df = 3) = 1.01
CT −.49** .16 [−.81, −.17]
EGRT −.27** .09 [−.45, −.08]
LT .02 .06 [−.11, .14]
MPL .17* .07 [.03, .31]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 8 .01 .21 [−.40, .42] QM (df = 2) = 0.53 QE (df = 5) = 29.05***
Yes −.11 .23 [−.56, .35]
Yes/No .02 .27 [−.50, .55]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 8 −.07 .07 [−.21, .08] QM (df = 2) = 4.77 QE (df = 5) = 12.64*
Constant −.19 .16 [−.52, .13]
Constant (50%) .17 .12 [−.06, .41]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 8 .05 .04 [−.02, .13] QM (df = 1) = 15.40*** QE (df = 6) = 8.44
Constant −.37*** .09 [−.56, −.19]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 8 −.11 .07 [−.25, .03] QM (df = 1) = 2.83 QE (df = 6) = 19.77**
Constant .22 .13 [−.04, .47]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept 6 .02 .32 [−.61, .64] QM (df = 1) = 0.02 QE (df = 4) = 17.02**
Risk averse choices % −.00 .00 [−.01, .01]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 8 .01 .08 [−.14, .16] QM (df = 1) = 1.92 QE (df = 6) = 24.36***
Yes −.20 .14 [−.48, .08]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 8 −.00 .06 [−.13, .12] QM (df = 1) = 2.25 QE (df = 6) = 17.93**
Yes −.26 .17 [−.59, .08]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***. Data available for the domain of losses was insuﬃcient to investigate the inﬂuence of
average payment as well as the incentive structure of the decision task used to measure risk aversion for males only.
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Table 12: Moderator analysis for the domain of losses — females only.
Moderator K β SE 95% CI Test of Moderators Test of Residual Heterogeneity
Sample Type Intercept (S) 8 .11** .04 [.03, .18] QM (df = 1) = 13.40*** QE (df = 6) = 4.08
CS −.18*** .05 [−.28, −.09]
CAM Intercept (CATB) 8 −.08* .03 [−.14, −.02] QM (df = 2) = 15.50*** QE (df = 5) = 3.04
CRT .19*** .05 [.10, .29]
RPM .08 .16 [−.24, .40]
Decision Task Intercept (ALT) 8 −.06 .15 [−.35, .22] QM (df = 4) = 1.33 QE (df = 3) = 8.47*
CT −.15 .26 [−.66, .36]
EGRT .07 .26 [−.44, .57]
LT .06 .17 [−.28, .39]
MPL .14 .21 [−.27, .55]
Certain Option Intercept (No) 8 −.06 .07 [−.20, .07] QM (df = 2) = 4.84 QE (df = 5) = 6.50
Yes .13 .08 [−.03, .30]
Yes/No −.08 .12 [−.32, .16]
Probabilities Intercept (Changes) 8 −.08* .03 [−.14, −.02] QM (df = 2) = 15.50*** QE (df = 5) = 3.05
Constant .08 .16 [−.24, .40]
Constant (50%) .19*** .05 [.10, .29]
Payoff Safer Choice Intercept (Changes) 8 .01 .05 [−.10, .11] QM (df = 1) = 0.60 QE (df = 6) = 18.22**
Constant −.11 .14 [−.39, .17]
Payoff Riskier Choice Intercept (Changes) 8 −.07* .03 [−.13, −.01] QM (df = 1) = 15.82*** QE (df = 6) = 3.28
Constant .19*** .05 [.10, .28]
Risk Averse Choices % Intercept 6 .34** .11 [.12, .56] QM (df = 1) = 6.31* QE (df = 4) = 5.33
Risk averse choices % −.01* .00 [−.01, −.00]
Primary purpose Intercept (No) 8 .03 .05 [−.07, .13] QM (df = 1) = 2.20 QE (df = 6) = 16.38*
Yes −.18 .12 [−.41, .06]
Beta Imputed Intercept (No) 8 −.01 .05 [−.12, .09] QM (df = 1) = 0.01 QE (df = 6) = 19.10**
Yes .02 .20 [−.37, .40]
Note. p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***. Data available for the domain of losses was insuﬃcient to investigate the inﬂuence of
average payment as well as the incentive structure of the decision task used to measure risk aversion for females only.
